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I. THE BEGINNING TO AN END 
A. INTRODUCTION  
A major mission of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) is building partner 
capacity (BPC) of foreign government forces allied with the United States, or indigenous 
resistance forces in countries hostile to U.S. security or interests. For example, U.S. 
special operations forces have been heavy involved in building partner capacity with the 
Philippines following the September 11 attacks on the United States.1 More recently, 
U.S. SOF has been active in advising elements of the Syrian opposition forces fighting 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).2 As these two examples illustrate, in the 
post-September 11 security environment, BPC has taken on greater importance as a 
strategy to combat both state and non-state actors. This is especially true in the “Gray 
Zone,” an environment characterized by “competitive interactions among and within state 
and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.”3 Within this 
zone, BPC efforts apply to a variety of missions, including security forces assistance, 
foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare.4  
The importance of BPC, however, is not limited to special operations missions; it 
is rooted in the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. For 
example, in his opening comments of the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy, President 
Obama writes, “Abroad, we are demonstrating that while we will act unilaterally against 
threats to our core interests, we are stronger when we mobilize collective action.”5 This 
statement reflects a theme of cooperation between the United States and its partners and 
                                                 
1 Linda Robinson et al., U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014, 2016, 17. 
2 Peter Baker, Helen Cooper, and David Sanger, “Obama Sends Special Operations Forces to Help 
Fight ISIS in Syria,” The New York Times, October 30, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1kYA6M3. 
3 Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone” (U.S. Special Operations Command, September 9, 2015). 
4 For more on these forms of warfare, see: Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 Security Force Assistance, Joint 
Publication 3–22 Foreign Internal Defense, and Joint Publication 3–05.1 Unconventional Warfare. 
5 “National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015). 
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allies; in fact, the word partner is stated no less than seventy-one times in the document.6 
Similarly, the word partner is found in the 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy fifty 
times, and much of the language in the National Military Strategy focuses on BPC and 
developing interoperability with allies and partners.7 The implied understanding of these 
two documents is that the United States, and its military, will increasingly work alongside 
its allies and partners in pursuit of U.S. national security objectives. 
Despite concurrence about the importance of BPC for addressing an array of U.S. 
national security concerns, special operations planners often disagree on the conditions 
that positively affect these BPC relationships. Factors such as cultural diversity, 
differences in types of government, actual forms of support, the length of the sponsor-
client relationship, and the number of BPC sponsors per client can all have a bearing on 
the success or failure of BPC. However, relatively little research has tested these 
variables rigorously to better understand which variables matter and under what 
conditions. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis aims to identify and examine the variables that lead to BPC success. 
Specifically, this thesis will investigate the following question: What variables indicate 
an increased chance of success or failure of a building partner capacity program? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To investigate this question, this thesis will employ a mixed methods approach. It 
begins by providing a comprehensive survey on BPC literature, including quantitative, 
qualitative and organizational design modeling approaches to studying BPC success or 
failure. From this literature review, the thesis will propose two quantitative models to test 
several key variables and their effect on BPC success, which this thesis defines as the 
BPC client achieving military victory.  
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015” (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, June 2015).1, 12. 
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With two quantitative models, this thesis will investigate the following variables 
and their effect on BPC success: the cultural difference between BPC sponsors and 
clients; the difference in sponsor and client forms of government; the effects of ten 
different types of support (troops, access to territory, access to infrastructure, weapons, 
materiel and logistics, training, funding, intelligence, other forms of support, and support 
unknown); the length of the sponsor-client relationship in years; and the effects of 
multiple sponsors on the likelihood of the client achieving military victory. This thesis 
will draw from several preexisting datasets to test these variables, including the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) External Support Dataset,8 the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset,9 the UCDP Actor Dataset,10 the Center for Systemic Peace Polity 
IV Project Dataset,11 and the World Bank GDP Per Capita Dataset.12 In total, the thesis 
will test 131,072 configurations of a model that uses over 30,000 data points divided into 
1,873 observations to gain a fresh perspective on BPC.  
Alongside a quantitative analysis using big data, the thesis will also provide a 
qualitative case study designed to give these variables and their significance real-life 
context. Specifically, the thesis will investigate the Dhofar Rebellion of 1965 to 1975 in 
Oman, in which the British and Iranians acted as sponsors to the Omani government in 
the conduct of a counterinsurgency campaign against the People’s Front for the 
Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). The PFLOAG was, by contrast, 
sponsored by likeminded Marxist-based governments including a combination of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People’s Republic of China, the USSR, and 
                                                 
8 Mihai Cătălin Croicu et al., “The UCDP External Support- Disaggregated/Supporter Dataset v. 1.0-
2011” (Uppsala, Sweden: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, December 8, 2011), 
http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. 
9 Joakim Kreutz, “The UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v. 2–2015” (Uppsala, Sweden: The 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, February 19, 2016), http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. 
10 “The UCDP Actor Dataset v. 2.2-2015” (Uppsala, Sweden: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
October 12, 2015), http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. 
11 “Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015 Dataset” (Vienna, 
Virginia, USA: Center for Systemic Peace), accessed June 1, 2016, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
12 “The World Bank GDP Per Capita Dataset (Current US$)” (Washington, DC: The World Bank), 
accessed June 1, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
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Iraq. The thesis selected the Dhofar Rebellion because within the U.S. BPC community, 
this conflict is a lesser-known BPC effort that involved major European, Middle Eastern, 
and Asian world powers, and which provides unique illustrations of the effects of this 
thesis' variables on BPC.  
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The statistical analysis of key variables and their effect on BPC yielded the 
following findings: First, in general, the bigger the difference in culture the less likely the 
client is to achieve military victory. Conversely, when sponsors and clients closely share 
both cultural and economic similarities—what this thesis calls the “near-peer effect”—
they are less likely to achieve success than sponsors and clients who possess an ideal 
degree of cultural and economic differences.  
Second, the analysis reveals that the more sponsors involved in a BPC effort, the 
less likely a client is to achieve military victory. This finding is likely because the more 
sponsors that are involved in a conflict, the more complicated the management of each 
sponsor-client relationship is to the BPC effort. Planners should note that while an 
international alliance may lend political credibility to the BPC effort, it may also 
complicate the tactical mission on the ground.  
Third, extended partnerships may hinder BPC efforts. This finding is tied to the 
observation that the longer a conflict continues, the less likely it is to result in a clear 
military victory for the client, and the more likely it is to result in a negotiated peace 
agreement, stalemate, or military loss for the client. This observation suggests that 
extended conflicts take a toll on both sponsors and clients alike. By contrast, this thesis 
finds that front-loading support from sponsors to clients both early and decisively in the 
BPC relationship leads to military victory and BPC success. 
Fourth, this thesis identifies access to infrastructure and funding as the two most 
important types of support to provide BPC partners for military victory. Access to a 
sponsor’s infrastructure, specifically the sponsor’s military and intelligence 
infrastructure, requires both an intimate relationship and a high degree of trust from the 
sponsor. However, both quantitative and qualitative analyses show that this type of 
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support greatly benefits the client. Funding, arguably the simplest form of support to 
provide, is also highly effective for military success but still requires diligence on the part 
of the sponsor to ensure that the client employs it effectively. This oversight also calls for 
a close sponsor-client relationship. 
Finally, this thesis reveals that there is not enough information in the combined 
dataset to determine if a difference in government type between sponsors and clients has 
a significant effect on the success or failure of a BPC effort. As such, more research is 
required in this area to further develop an understanding of the role of governance types 
in BPC.  
E. AUDIENCE  
This thesis aims to inform two specific audiences: The United States Army 
Special Operations Command (USASOC), and the various Theater Special Operations 
Commands (TSOCs). As the largest component of the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM), USASOC is responsible for manning, training, and equipping 
the Army’s special operations forces that will be executing a large portion of the BPC 
effort for the foreseeable future. TSOCs act as the joint headquarters for all special 
operations in their respective Geographic Combatant Commands; TSOCs, therefore, are 
critical for the preparation, synchronization, sustainment, and ultimately the success of 
many BPC efforts. Additional audiences that may find this thesis useful are international 
partners and allies of the United States, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. 
Department of Justice, which are agencies that typically partner with the DOD in BPC 
operations.   
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The subsequent chapters of the thesis are organized as follows: Chapter II begins 
by reviewing several definitions of BPC, and settles on the following definition for the 
thesis: “a whole-of-government approach that refers to any activity to enhance a partner’s 
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ability to provide security within or outside of their borders.”13 The chapter then analyzes 
the existing body of research on BPC, which it divides into three categories: qualitative, 
quantitative, and organizational design modeling. Finally, Chapter II identifies a gap in 
research—the importance of culture and its effects on BPC efforts—and leverages two of 
Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as an analytical tool: power distance, and 
individualism. 
Chapter III provides an overview of the models this thesis uses to analyze BPC 
relationships and programs. It highlights the use of modeling in previous conflict research 
and introduces the variables of interest associated with this research effort: difference in 
sponsor and client culture; difference in sponsor and client forms of government; the 
types of support provided; the number of years the sponsor supported the client; and the 
number of sponsors per client.  
Chapter IV introduces the results of the regression conducted on the dataset 
developed for the thesis. Specifically, it finds: the greater the cultural difference between 
sponsor and client, the lesser the chance of BPC success; access to infrastructure and 
funding are the two most important types of BPC support; the longer a BPC relationship 
is maintained, the lower the probability of BPC success; and the higher the number of 
sponsors per client, the lower the clients’ probability of achieving military victory. 
Chapter IV concludes by employing a receiver operating characteristics curve and 
Bayesian model averaging to check the accuracy of Model II.  
Chapter V tests the findings of the statistical analysis in Chapter IV through a 
qualitative analysis of the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman from 1965 to 1975, in which the 
British successfully overcame their cultural disadvantage by establishing an intimate 
“inter-structure” with their Omani counterparts at the tactical and operational levels. The 
Chinese and the Soviet Union, by contrast, squandered their inherent cultural advantage 
by unsuccessfully attempting to substitute their Marxist collectivism for the Dhofari 
                                                 
13 Anthony F. Heisler, “By, With, and Through: The Theory and Practice of Special Operations 
Capacity-Building” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 50.   
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rebels’ natural tribal collectivism. This case study provides further nuance into how to 
conduct a successful BPC operation. 
Finally, Chapter VI concludes the thesis by providing a summary and key 
findings. Additionally, the chapter discusses the implications of the key findings for BPC 
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II. BACKGROUND: DOD AND INTERNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIPS   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Cold War, and especially following September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
military and interagency communities have had an interest in building and improving 
partnership operations, or building partnership capacity (BPC). This interest has led to a 
rise in research and analysis of BPC programs in both academic and military circles. The 
collective understanding of how to successfully choose and conduct BPC, however, is 
quite diverse. As a result, it is difficult to find a consensus in the literature on the 
definition of BPC.  
This chapter aims to provide a brief overview of BPC. It begins with a brief 
summary of definitions of BPC and its purpose. It then offers highlights of various 
methods aimed at evaluating BPC, including qualitative analysis, quantitative research, 
and organizational design models. Following this overview, the chapter identifies a gap in 
the BPC research—the cultural differences between BPC sponsor and client—and 
reviews research conducted outside of the defense field to formulate a quantitative 
analytical approach to address this deficiency.  
The chapter proposes that research conducted in the fields of organizational 
anthropology and international business provide useful insights for statistically assessing 
how cultural differences affect BPC efforts. These insights can then inform statistical 
analyses of U.S. and partner nations engaging in BPC. This analysis will allow for a more 
informed “way forward” in the conduct of BPC, specifically in areas in which the 
structural odds are already stacked against success. This is an important distinction, as the 
locations chosen for the U.S. to conduct BPC are based on national security interests, 
which are oftentimes in areas with the most challenging dynamics at play. 
B. DEFINING BPC 
Because of the depth of research done on BPC, analysts have addressed the topic 
from multiple points of view, including from the academic, policy and practitioner 
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perspectives. Therefore, devising a working definition that covers these different 
approaches to the topic is difficult. Despite this, it is important to consider other efforts at 
defining the term in an attempt to create a common operating picture.  
One useful definition of BPC comes from Janet St. Laurent, the Managing 
Director of U.S. Defense Capabilities and Management, who described BPC in a 2013 
testimony to the House Armed Services Committee as “a broad range of security 
cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign partners and allies 
and further the U.S. objective of securing international peace and cooperation.”14 While 
useful, the goal of “international peace and cooperation” is too broad a definition for this 
thesis.  
Interestingly, the Department of Defense does not define the term “building 
partnership capacity” in its Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms.15  However, the Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity, an office within the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, has a useful definition of BPC. Their website 
states that BPC programs aim “to advance partner nation capacity and capabilities 
through the provision of training and equipment, and include a series of Title 10 
humanitarian-based programs that provides DOD the ability to accomplish national 
security objectives through military-civilian engagement.”16 This description, limited to 
training, equipment, and humanitarian assistance programs, is too narrow for the 
purposes of this thesis.  
Perhaps the most useful definition comes from a recent thesis published by the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), which defines BPC as, “a whole-of-government 
approach that refers to any activity to enhance a partner’s ability to provide security 
                                                 
14 Janet A. St. Laurent, Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department 
of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2013), 1. 
15 Department of Defense, JP 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, 2016. 
16 “Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity (BPC),” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, July 
13, 2016, http://www.dsca.mil/about-us/programs-pgm. 
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within or outside of their borders.”17  The thesis’ author, Anthony Heisler, provides a 
clearly identified end state for BPC, succinctly stated, while maintaining the requirement 
for an approach that is larger than just the military.  
The purpose of BPC efforts then, at least on the surface, appears quite simple—it 
is to improve the security force capabilities of other nations or actors therefore 
disengaging, or at least limiting, direct U.S. involvement in external security matters. The 
United States engages in BPC activities through a variety of means: military aid 
coordinated through the local U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation, joint combined 
exchange training, annual war games and exercises, and international student exchanges 
at professional military education courses and schools to name just a few.    
Currently, several U.S. departments and agencies are responsible for 
administering BPC programs that use a mix of both general purpose and special 
operations forces. This includes the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, which focuses 
on developing ministerial level core competencies such as “personnel and readiness, 
logistics, strategy and policy, and financial management.”18 These agencies are also 
responsible for large-scale annual exercises, such as Eager Lion in the Kingdom of 
Jordan, which is the largest military exercise in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, 
and involves some 3,000 service members from both countries.19 
At times, analysts have criticized U.S.-sponsored BPC programs for lack of long-
term planning and consistency. For example, with reference to BPC programs, Jason 
Terry states, in “Principles of Building Partnership Capacity” that “organizations conduct 
operations and engagements and then look for ways to make minor adjustments to the 
engagement so they can categorize it as ‘BPC’ rather than build a BPC effort from the 
                                                 
17 Heisler, “By, With, and Through,” 50. 
18 “Ministry of Defense Advisors,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, July 13, 2016, 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/ministry-defense-advisors. 
19 Cheryl Pellerin, “Votel: Eager Lion 16 Highlights U.S.-Jordanian Force Integration,” CENTCOM, 
May 23, 2016, http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-
View/Article/885359/votel-eager-lion-16-highlights-us-jordan-force-integration/. 
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beginning.”20 U.S. BPC efforts have also suffered from a lack of consistent funding. One 
major funding initiative for U.S. BPC is the 1206 Global Train and Equip program, 
which focuses on partner counterterrorism efforts. This program, however, only allocates 
funds for one or two years—limiting any long-range planning.21 
With these challenges in mind, several studies have aimed to better understand the 
intricacies of the BPC process. The U.S. government and think tanks have used a mixture 
of methods, cases, data, goals and measures of effectiveness in these studies, leading to a 
concern for a lack of coordination and clear objectives in research efforts. For example, 
Terry notes, “What is often lacking, however, is the development of a coordinated 
approach of the multitude of engagements towards a comprehensive objective prior to 
initiating the endeavor.”22 Additionally, a recent RAND report notes that, “measurable 
objectives that explicitly connect to broader U.S. government, theater, regional, and 1206 
program goals are currently lacking for the 1206 program.”23  
Given these concerns about the U.S. conduct of BPC, the seemingly ubiquitous 
nature of BPC programs around the world, and the criticality of BPC to achieve U.S. 
national security objectives, it is clear that BPC is a crucially important topic in the field 
of defense analysis. In order to devise a more systematic and comprehensive approach in 
assessing BPC, it is important to first review the methods and approaches various 
researchers have already employed.    
C. BPC RESEARCH 
Scholars have used three broad methods to analyze U.S. efforts at BPC: 
qualitative, focusing primarily on case studies; quantitative; and organizational design 
                                                 
20 Jason B. Terry, “Principles of Building Partnership Capacity” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2010), 2. 
21 Christopher Paul, What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts, 
Research Report RR-937-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 25. 
22  Terry, “Principles of Building Partnership Capacity,” 3. 
23 Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in Developing 
Countries?: A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip “1206” Program (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2011), xvi.  
 13
approaches. Each of these approaches offer different strengths and weaknesses in better 
understanding BPC programs.  
1. Qualitative Research 
By far, the most developed subset of BPC research and analysis uses qualitative 
analysis. A good example of qualitative BPC analysis is Kevin Berkompas’ thesis, 
“Toward Strategy for Building Partner Capacity: Combined Ownership and Operations.” 
Berkompas focuses on the BPC client-sponsor relationship, advocating for the use of a 
Combined Ownership-Operations Program (CO-OP).24 Berkompas argues that a CO-OP 
would, in essence, create “a true ‘partner-partner’ relationship as opposed to a ‘patron-
client’ one.”25 While the use of a CO-OP is interesting, the “patron-client,” or sponsor-
client relationship, as it is termed here, which involves a hierarchy of resources and a 
hierarchy in the relationship, is far more common; therefore, the datasets employed in 
this thesis focus on sponsor-client relationships.  
Another example of a qualitative approach to researching BPC is Steven Bury’s 
NPS thesis, “Analysis of West African Drug Trafficking: The Dynamics of Interdiction 
and State Capacity,” which uses qualitative case studies to compare counternarcotic 
activities in Ghana and Guinea-Bissau to analyze the two countries’ “ability to absorb 
international counternarcotics partnerships.”26 Bury’s work investigates the success of 
counternarcotics efforts in Ghana, relative to those in Guinea-Bissau, to draw the 
conclusion that Ghana’s higher level of state capacity allowed it to absorb the 
counternarcotics training better, leading to a more successful BPC effort.27 This study, 
while qualitative in nature, uses data from the World Bank, cross-referenced with the 
number of post-training narcotics seizures, to justify its conclusions.28 Bury also hints at 
                                                 
24 Kevin L. Berkompas, “Toward Strategy for Building Partner Capacity: Combined Ownership and 
Operations” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 9. 
25 Ibid., 24. 
26 Steven Bury, “Analysis of West African Drug Trafficking: The Dynamics of Interdiction and State 
Capacity” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011),  v. 
27 Ibid., 35. 
28 Ibid., 10. 
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the research gaps available for studying BPC through open source datasets, something 
this thesis will expand upon.  
Similarly, Anthony Heisler’s NPS thesis, “By, With, and Through: The Theory 
and Practice of Special Operations Capacity-Building” provides an examination of BPC 
“from the top down through national security documents, doctrine, and case studies.”29 
Heisler uses the U.S. Special Operations Command-South’s efforts in Colombia and 
Paraguay to provide a holistic overview of what he terms the Theory of BPC.30 From this 
analysis, Heisler produces “Seven Principles of Capacity Building”: 






7. Unity of Effort31 
Heisler’s work, while insightful, stresses the need for disparate BPC entities 
within the U.S. government to communicate and synchronize their BPC efforts. This 
thesis will build on Heisler’s work, but rather than investigate relationships within the 
U.S. government, it will focus on the relationship between the BPC sponsor and client. 
Another qualitative BPC focused piece is Michael Veneri’s article, “The Partner 
Predicament: U.S. Building Partnership Capacity, the War on Terrorism and What the 
U.S. Cannot Overlook.” Veneri argues that the BPC client selection process is critical to 
long-term success, focusing on identifying factors from two broad categories: compliance  
 
                                                 
29 Heisler, “By, With, and Through” v.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 137–138. 
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and capability.32 Of note, one of Veneri’s capability factors is “culture.”33 While he notes 
that “culture matters,” Veneri gives examples of cultural manifestations (e.g., government 
failure, corruption, and poorly educated work forces), rather than a more comprehensive 
explanation of what culture encompasses.34 This thesis aims to take a broader look at 
culture and its effects on BPC through statistical analysis.  
Perhaps most useful, Jason Terry’s qualitative thesis postulates ten considerations 
when designing and implementing BPC programs:        
1. BPC Starts and Ends with Diplomats 
2. Partner Nation Ownership of Capacity 
3. Understand Historical and Cultural Context 
4. Unity of Effort 
5. Understand and Articulate the Big Picture 
6. Legitimacy 
7. Regional Engagement 
8. Measurements of Progress 
9. Engage at Multiple Levels 
10. Seek Multiple Sources of Sound Multi-Year Funding35 
With a few exceptions, these same considerations appear throughout the 
qualitative body of BPC literature. For example, Emmanuel Cabahug’s article, “SOF 
Joint Combined Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective,” provides a more 
succinct but similar list, which includes the following variables: “commitment, 
continuity, and resources.”36  
                                                 
32 Michael Veneri, “The Partner Predicament: U.S. Building Partnership Capacity, the War on 
Terrorism and What the U.S. Cannot Overlook” (Arlington, VA: Synesis, 2011), 11. 
33 Ibid., 12. 
34 Ibid., 12–13. 
35 Terry, “Principles of Building Partnership Capacity,” 59–68. 
36 Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combined Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective,” 9. 
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Some of the qualitative research also argues for additional planning 
considerations in order to produce more refined BPC strategies. For example, several 
studies list criteria to consider when selecting partners. David Hodges and Robert 
Rowland in their NPS thesis, “Finding the Right Indigenous Leader and Force for 
Counterinsurgency Operations,” identify four characteristics to asses when selecting 
partner forces: motives, personal qualities, relationship with the community, and 
relationship with the local government.37 While these reports and observations are 
valuable, they have some limitations. Specifically, qualitative case studies are often 
limited in their ability to hold specific variables constant across cases, and anecdotal 
accounts rarely draw systematic comparisons.  
2. Quantitative Research 
Another research approach to analyzing BPC focuses on quantitative methods. 
The RAND Corporation has generated several reports with this approach, specifically 
“The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.”38 This 
tool, constructed in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, assesses countries through the use of 
measured weights and a utility scale to calculate a score of how likely it is a BPC 
enterprise between the client nations and the United States will succeed. While useful in 
generating variables for comparing U.S. sponsored state-level BPC efforts, the tool does 
not provide insight into partnerships other than those involved with the United States. In 
fact, there is little quantitative analysis that addresses the propensity for BPC success 
among international partnerships, or with regard to specific cultural characteristics within 
a group.  
Several other pieces of quantitative literature build on the findings of the RAND 
tool. These include the RAND report, “Developing an Army Strategy for Building 
Partner Capacity for Stability Operations,” the purpose of which is “to assist the U.S. 
                                                 
37 David Hodges and Robert Rowland, “Finding the Right Indigenous Leader and Force for 
Counterinsurgency Operations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011). 
38 Christopher Paul, “The Rand Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool” 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013). 
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Army, DOD, and other U.S. government agencies in developing a well-defined, well-
integrated BPC for stability operations strategy and to create a nexus between the 
concepts of BPC and stability operations.”39 While this report considers “political 
culture,” specifically a focus on government types, the study does not conduct an in-
depth analysis of the effect of cultural differences between BPC sponsor and client. 
William Hermann’s NPS thesis, “Choosing to Win: How SOF Can Better Select 
Partner Forces for Capacity Building,” builds upon two RAND studies: “The RAND 
Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool,” and “What Works 
Best When Building Partner Capacity.” Hermann’s analysis concludes that “the countries 
best suited to SOF training and advising are the ones that the RAND reports suggest are 
the least likely to build capacity.”40 Hermann goes on to assert that, in light of this 
disparity, theater special operations commands (TSOCs) must continue to research and 
develop creative solutions to achieving mission success. In other words, there is much 
work needed to better understand the conditions that produce BPC success.  
Other scholars have conducted quantitative studies at the strategic and operational 
level to better understand a specific type of BPC effort, such as a counterinsurgency 
campaign. One example is captured in an article by John Fishel and Max Manwaring, 
which critiques the SWORD model developed in the 1980s as a means of assessing 
the likelihood of success or failure for a counterinsurgency effort.41 While not 
specifically focused on partner force capacity building, the SWORD model provides a 
valuable example of how statistically significant quantifiable variables can be used to 
analyze a complex data set. This work, combined with the RAND tool, provides a 
framework from which scholars can potentially construct a quantitative model to assess 
the likelihood of success or failure in BPC sponsorship.  
                                                 
39 Jefferson P. Marquis, ed., Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability 
Operations, RAND Corporation Monograph Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), xiv. 
40 William Hermann, “Choosing to Win: How SOF Can Better Select Partner Forces for Capacity 
Building” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), v.  
41 John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, “The SWORD Model of Counterinsurgency: A Summary 
and Update,” Small Wars Journal, 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/152-
fishel.pdf. 
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3. Organizational Design BPC Research 
Finally, there is set of research that focuses on defining the issue of BPC 
operations through organizational design models. These works provide additional insight 
for identifying some of the major considerations involved in any large-scale operation: 
globalization, security, economics, politics, and culture. Thomas Barnett, an American 
military geostrategist, introduces one such model. He proposes dividing the world into 
two broad groups, the functioning core and the non-integrating gap, what he calls the 
“Core-Gap Model.”42   Barnett suggests that the U.S. military, through the use of force 
and stability operations, is capable of helping to bring non-integrated gap countries into 
the global economy which, in turn, would give the non-integrated gap an alternative 
option to violence and terrorism. In other words, this organizational model seeks to 
provide an alternative means with which to frame the problem of BPC. Once this re-
framing is accomplished, the model aims to make informed recommendations at the state 
level.   
James Keller, in his NPS thesis, creates what he calls the “Keller Partner Nation 
SOF Model.”43 Keller focuses on two previously developed counterinsurgency (COIN) 
models: the Wendt Military Elements of COIN model; and the oil-spot (also referenced 
as the clear-hold-build) model, which military historian Andrew F. Krepinevich 
advocated using in 2005 to achieve victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom.44 The Keller 
model builds on the previous models by prescribing the development of a Village 
Constabulary, a Civic Action Force, and a Movement to Contact Force. Keller describes 
the implementation of this model both from a single organization point of view, and a 
whole-of-government perspective. Throughout, Keller weighs the development of the 
partner nation forces against the need for organic partner nation sustainability of the 
forces developed, and the requirement to actively remove under-governed spaces from 
                                                 
42 Thomas P. M Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New 
York: Berkley Books, 2005). 
43 James C. Keller, “Fixing the Whole-of-Government Approach in Failed States–A Model for 
Security Force Assistance” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).  
44 Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, July 8, 2014, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2005-09-01/how-win-iraq. 
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which internal instability emanates. Although this is a valuable work for addressing the 
BPC requirements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is the case study 
Keller uses for his thesis, the characteristics he identifies and their applications have yet 
to be tested across the BPC spectrum.  
This thesis aims to build on these research initiatives to develop a quantitative 
investigation that will assess the significance of different types of BPC sponsorship (e.g., 
weapons, training, and intelligence), as well as key differences (e.g., polity and culture) 
between BPC sponsors and their clients. The intent is to identify what types of support, 
and what differences between BPC sponsor and client, are most significant when 
planning BPC operations.  
D. CULTURAL RESEARCH RELEVANT TO BPC 
As the United States increasingly relies on BPC programs to achieve its national 
security objectives, culture will certainly have increasing effects on the U.S. military and 
its operations, particularly BPC. Little research, however, has focused on the effect of 
cultural differences on BPC efforts. This gap may be explained by the fact that the word 
culture is not an easy term to define or operationalize.  
To address this concern, this section examines anthropological, psychological, 
sociological, economic, and business works on culture with the goal of providing a close 
examination of the definitions and concepts of culture, as well as identifying why 
understanding culture matters for BPC efforts.  
The word culture has a variety of meanings in the academic fields in which it is 
studied. For example, linguist and psychologist, Helen Spencer-Oatey, in her article, 
“What is Culture? A Compilation of Quotes,” states that, “Culture is a notoriously 
difficult term to define.”45 Spencer-Oatey goes on to highlight a quote from the 
Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics that observes, “Despite a century of efforts to 
define culture adequately, there was in the early 1990s no agreement among 
                                                 
45 Helen Spencer-Oatey, “What Is Culture? A Compilation of Quotations” (Warwick: University of 
Warwick, 2012), 1. 
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anthropologists regarding its nature.”46 In a broader observation of society, Geert 
Hofstede et al. point out that, “In most Western languages culture commonly means 
‘civilization’ or ‘refinement of the mind’ and in particular the results of such refinement, 
such as education, art, and literature.”47 Spencer-Oatey provides another quote by the 
19th century British anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tyler, who defined culture as, 
“that complete whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any 
other capabilities and habits by man as a member of society.”48 It is clear from these 
observations that culture, for many, is a broad concept that attempts to create a single 
label for tangible and intangible aspects of a group including art, behaviors, and 
language. 
Within the past 100 years, however, researchers from many fields have sought to 
develop a narrower, more useful, definition of culture. Spencer-Oatey defines culture as, 
“a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, 
procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that 
influence (but do not determine) each member’s behaviour and his/her interpretations of 
the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behaviour.”49 In this definition, Spencer-Oatey narrows 
the characterization of culture by starting with assumptions and values, and eliminating 
art and other manifestations.  
Organizational anthropologist Geert Hofstede also aims to refine the definition of 
culture, attempting to make it relevant to international business in particular. In one of his 
earlier works, Culture’s Consequence: International Differences in Work Related Values 
(1984), Hofstede argues culture is, “the collective programming of the mind which 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Geert H. Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software 
of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
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distinguished the members of one human group from another.”50 He recognizes that, 
“This is not a complete definition,” and that in some fields there is reason to note the 
manifestations of culture within the definition. He highlights, however, that his definition 
is culture at its core, and that it, “includes systems of values; and values are among the 
building blocks of culture.”51 Hofstede’s subsequent research has refined his definition of 
culture. In a later publication, Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov defined 
culture as the “software of the mind.” They still recognize culture as the shared “patterns 
of thinking, feeling, and acting mental programs” within a group, but updated their 
definition with more contemporary vernacular.52  
Spencer-Oatey and Hofstede et al. agree that, at its core, culture is values. 
Spencer-Oatey identifies values as the level of culture that connects a society’s basic 
assumptions with its artifacts, behaviors, technology and art.53 Hofstede et al. describe 
values as “a certain tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others.”54 These 
preferences produce patterns of action, feelings, and perceptions among the people in a 
society.  
To address the cultural aspects of BPC, this thesis will draw on both Hofstede et 
al. and Spencer-Oatey, and define culture as the collection of basic assumptions and 
values that manifest themselves in individual and collective behavior and in the 
interpretations of that behavior within a group. 
In addition to defining culture, many researchers have also sought to establish a 
framework to better understand cultural differences. Geert Hofstede, a pioneer in the field 
of measuring cultural values, created cultural dimensions in order to measure relative 
differences in cultural values; these dimensions are now internationally recognized, and 
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used in business, psychological, and economic research.55 Briefly, Hofstede’s four 
dimensions are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. 
Hofstede defines power distance as “the degree to which the less powerful members of a 
society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.”56 He defines uncertainty 
avoidance as “the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity,”57 and individualism as “a preference for a loosely-knit social 
framework in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their 
immediate families.”58 Lastly, Hofstede defines masculinity as “a preference in society 
for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success.”59 
While definitions of culture and Hofstede’s framework are insightful they do not 
in themselves demonstrate the importance of understanding a group’s culture. The 
significance of culture is that it actively affects the behaviors of groups and individuals. 
In Culture and Organizations, Hofstede et al. argue that it is a combination of a group’s 
culture, a person’s personality, and individual circumstance that will determine actions. 
Their research duly notes, however, that people are, of course, not computers and can 
deviate from their own mental programming.60 Hofstede et al. conclude that, “The 
software of the mind (culture) … only indicates what reactions are likely and 
understandable, given one’s past.”61 
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Like Hofstede et al., Spencer-Oatey observes that culture “affects behavior and 
interpretations of behavior.”62 Spencer-Oatey focuses her discussion on how culture 
affects behavior at the individual level, providing examples of how an individual’s 
actions are interpreted differently by parties during a cross-cultural interaction.63 One 
example Spencer-Oatey provides is a story of a Native American father picking his child 
up in a classroom while school is in session. The teacher warmly greets the father, telling 
him how well his son is doing in the class. The father remains silent, waiting for his son 
to get his books together, and then leaves with his son. The teacher is taken aback, 
disappointed in the rude nature of the father—not to say hello or even introduce himself. 
The father, however, felt he was being respectful to the classroom environment, and did 
not want to offend the teacher by speaking or interrupting.64 This same dynamic can 
easily manifest in BPC scenarios, resulting in confusion and misunderstandings.  
Hofstede provides a similar example of behavior, and its interpretation, through 
different cultures’ understanding of time. Hofstede presents a situation in which a woman 
has an appointment, and describes how culture influences if the woman will be late, on 
time, or early for the meeting. Hofstede highlights how values influence the situation’s 
outcome.65  
In, “What is Culture? A Compilation of Quotes,” Spencer-Oatey also notes that 
“culture is subject to gradual change.”66 Spencer-Oatey expounds upon this by 
illustrating that anthropologists will certainly find differences in a group as they 
intermittently interact with the group over time. This, Spencer-Oatey states, is because, 
“there are no cultures that remain completely static year after year.”67 Research has now 
shown that certain cultural values tend to change over time, while others do remain static.  
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Building on this discussion of culture and values, this thesis will focus 
particularly on two aspects of the Hofstede dimensions that are of importance to BPC: 
power distance and individualism. Understanding the power distance and individualism 
dynamics in a given group provide additional insights well beyond the possible prediction 
of economic indicators. Insights garnered from these dimensions will help those involved 
in BPC efforts understand dynamics in partner units. For example, in Culture’s 
Consequence, Hofstede highlights that in low power distance countries, such as the 
United States, societies view power with the following norms, “inequality in society 
should be minimized,” “superiors are people like me,” and, “powerful people should try 
to look less powerful than they are.”68 In high power distance countries, such as India, 
society views power with differing norms: “there should be an order of inequality in this 
world,” “subordinates consider superiors as being of a different kind,” and, 
“powerholders are entitled to privileges.”69 These differences are not trivial, and could 
affect a BPC effort.  
Similar to power distance, differences in individualism could also result in 
confusion and disarray during a BPC effort. In reference to low individualism countries, 
Hofstede notes, “individual initiative is socially frowned upon,” “social relations [are] 
predetermined in terms of in-groups,” and, “managers choose duty, expertness, and 
prestige as life goals.”70 Conversely, in high individualism countries, “individual 
initiative is socially encouraged,” individuals “need to make specific friendships,” and 
“managers choose pleasure, affection, and security as life goals.”71 Like power distance, 
the differences between these two perspectives are striking, and misunderstanding their 
implications could detract from BPC efforts.  
As potentially helpful as insights into the values of power distance and 
individualism are to achieving BPC success, the reality is that the countries in which 
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Hofstede has conducted research are not always the ones where the United States 
conducts BPC operations. Specifically, Hofstede’s most current cultural values database 
only has 111 countries, omitting many of the conflict prone regions that the U.S. military 
is heavily involved in with BPC efforts. The United States typically conducts BPC 
operations where state actors have active security interests, which tend to be in areas 
experiencing some degree of violence. This same environment does not always lend itself 
to researchers conducting surveys. Therefore, to harness the potential benefits of 
understanding how differences in power distance and individualism can affect BPC 
operations, this thesis turns to an alternative data source that researchers have found to 
correlate with power distance and individualism: per capita GDP. 
In their paper, “A Framework to Update Hofstede’s Cultural Value Indices: 
Economic Dynamic and Institutional Stability,” Linghui Tang and Peter Koveos 
demonstrate through quantitative analysis that the cultural dimensions of power distance 
and individualism are correlated to per capita GDP. Specifically, they find that as per 
capita GDP increases, individualism increases, and power distance decreases.72 This is 
likely because, in societies with high individualism, people are expected to take care of 
themselves, which, in turn, tends to engender a higher degree of innovation. Furthermore, 
if an individual is innovative and prosperous on his or her own, as opposed to being 
dependent on society’s leadership to provide that prosperity, he or she expects their 
society’s power and authority to be dispersed to a greater degree.  
Tang and Koveos argue that, as a result of the correlation of per capita GDP with 
both power distance and individualism, these two cultural dimensions can be updated 
annually based on economic indicators. Additionally, Tang and Koveos find that 
Hofstede’s other dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, are more closely 
tied to institutional considerations than economic factors.73 
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Of note, other scholars have corroborated Tang and Koveos’ findings. For 
example, Scott Nadler and James Zemanek find in their examination of cultural 
differences and economic development that per capita GDP is correlated to power 
distance and individualism as well.74 Similarly, Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Gerard Roland 
find in their paper, “Which Dimensions of Culture Matter for Long Term Growth?” that 
individualism “has a strong and robust effect on log GDP per capita.”75 The use of log 
per capita GDP by Gorodnichenko and Roland is significant because it accounts for the 
wide disparity in global per capita GDPs. As an example, if a researcher did not apply the 
log to the per capita GDP of countries such as Singapore or the United States, these 
countries would skew the data on the high end. Conversely, countries such as Bangladesh 
would skew the data on the lower end. For this same reason, this thesis employs the log 
per capita GDP in its research, allowing the data to be transformed without losing its 
usefulness.  
The findings of each of these studies are significant for the DOD because major 
information gaps exist regarding cultural values in many regions of the world. While this 
limits the DOD’s ability to understand certain cultural values (uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity), it does not limit the understanding of individualism and power distance. As 
a result of Tang’s and Koveos’ research, which finds a correlation between high per 
capita GDP with both high individualism and low power distance, the DOD has a 
variable—per capita GDP—to substitute for these dimensions when conducting analysis 
of areas lacking cultural data. 
Given this discussion, this thesis will use GDP as a proxy for measuring power 
distance and individualism in assessing BPC relationships. It proposes that approaching 
BPC with a cultural lens will allow the DOD to better understand how specific cultures 
shape behavior. Understanding the impact of this type of dynamic on BPC efforts is 
essential for the U.S. military as it moves forward in its partnerships and alliances.  
                                                 
74 Nadler and Zemanek, “Cultural Differences and Economic Development of 31 Countries.” 
75 Gorodnichenko and Roland, “Culture, Institutions, and Development: Which Dimensions of Culture 
Matter for Long-Run Growth.” 
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E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed several definitions of BPC, ultimately settling on the 
one provided by Heisler: “a whole-of-government approach that refers to any activity to 
enhance a partner’s ability to provide security within or outside of their borders.”76 The 
chapter then analyzed the existing body of research on BPC, which it divides into three 
categories: qualitative, quantitative, and organizational design modeling. Finally, this 
chapter established a gap in the existing body of research, specifically regarding the use 
of two of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as an analytical tool: power distance, and 
individualism.  
Chapter III will build a logistics regression model to determine which factors 
affect whether the BPC client achieves military victory over their opponent. This will 
involve merging multiple datasets, both categorical and continuous, to capture the 
applicable factors in determining the probability of a BPC client’s success or failure. 
Chapter III will also establish four hypotheses about the outcome of the analysis based on 
assumptions and observations found in the qualitative BPC literature, as well as personal 
anecdotal experience in conducting BPC operations in practice. 
  
                                                 
76 Heisler, “By, With, and Through,” 50. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS, CULTURE, AND BPC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Defense analysis is not the only field where practitioners consider international 
partnerships crucial to organizational success. In fact, military researchers can draw 
unique conclusions and gain new insights by employing the research methods from many 
other disciplines when studying defense-related issues. For example, as highlighted in 
Chapter II, international business researchers have conducted countless studies on the 
roles that culture, governance, and relationships play in forming successful international 
partnerships and affecting profits. These studies offer useful clues for how to build 
successful transnational partnerships.  
Bridging the gap between the international business and defense analysis fields, 
this thesis employs a statistical model to quantitatively analyze specific factors that could 
affect BPC efforts. Specifically, the thesis uses techniques often employed to analyze the 
factors affecting international commercial relationships to examine international security 
partnerships. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the model, which analyzes BPC 
and the variables the model contains.  
This chapter begins with a broad overview of the BPC model (Figure 1) employed 
in the thesis. The chapter then describes each of the variables used in the model. This 
description begins with the dependent variable, which is if the client achieved military 
victory. The chapter then summarizes each of the model’s sixteen independent variables. 
Following this summary, the chapter introduces the mathematical formulations for the 
logistics regression model, which tests the sixteen independent variables for their effect 
on the outcome. Finally, this chapter proposes four hypotheses with expected effects 
between the model’s variables of interest and its outcome.  
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B. THE MODEL 
As Chapter II notes, the SWORD model provides an example of how to conduct 
quantitative analysis of a complex, conflict-based dataset.77 This thesis draws from this 
model to build its own unique formula. Specifically, whereas the SWORD model focuses 
on the likelihood of success or failure of a counterinsurgency campaign, this thesis 
focuses on the significance of specific variables within the context of BPC operations and 
relationships. In order to build this model, this thesis defines key terms, specifically the 
BPC sponsor-client relationship, and the model’s unit of analysis. 
1. Definition of Sponsor and Client 
Drawing from the UCDP External Support Project-Disaggregated/Supporter 
Dataset, this thesis defines the sponsor as “a party providing external support.”78 This 
party can include “a state government, a diaspora, a non-state rebel group, an 
organization such as an NGO [non-governmental organization] or IGO [inter-
governmental organization], a political party, a company or a lobby group, or even an 
individual.”79  
A client is the receiver of a sponsor’s support, and is one of the primary actors 
within the conflict.80 Further, a client can be either a state or non-state actor. For 
example, the Salvadoran Civil War, fought between the Government of El Salvador and 
the Farabundo Martì National Liberation Front (FMLN) provides a useful illustration of 
the sponsor and client relationship. Within the conflict, the United States was a sponsor to 
the Government of El Salvador. Conversely, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) was a sponsor to the FMLN. Within this context, both the Government of El 
Salvador and the FMLN were clients, albeit on opposing sides of the conflict. 
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2. Unit of Analysis 
The BPC model employs a unit of analysis defined by four characteristics: the 
conflict, the client, the sponsor, and the year in which the support occurred. Each conflict 
in the combined dataset is uniquely differentiated. For example, the dataset discriminates 
between the Soviet-Afghan War and Operation Enduring Freedom, even though both 
conflicts occurred primarily in Afghanistan.  
Within each conflict observation, the dataset differentiates between each unique 
sponsor-client pairing. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), both the 
United States and the United Kingdom provided support to the Government of Iraq. The 
dataset recognizes the U.S.-Iraq, and UK-Iraq, sponsor-client pairings separately.  
Within each conflict/sponsor-client observation, the dataset further divides the 
observations by year. As an example, within the context of OIF, the dataset differentiates 
between the United States providing the Government of Iraq weapons in 2004, and 
the United States providing the Government of Iraq weapons in 2005. This results 
in a dataset broken down into conflict/sponsor-client/year observations. These 
conflict/sponsor-client/year observations are thus the unit of analysis for this thesis. 
Within each conflict/sponsor-client/year observation, the dataset differentiates 
between ten different types of support, which the next section explains further. For 
example, within the context of OIF, the dataset differentiates between the United States 
providing the Government of Iraq weapons, from the United States providing the 
Government of Iraq intelligence. In other words, the model measures different types of 
sponsor support independently. 
3. Causal Relationship between the Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
At the most basic level, the model seeks to answer what variables most heavily 
influence the likelihood of client success in a BPC relationship, which this thesis defines 
as definitive military victory; this definition will be explained further later in this chapter.   
This thesis postulates that cultural similarities, governmental similarities, 
increased number of sponsors, and demonstrated long-term support increases the 
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likelihood of success for a sponsor. The variables associated with these suppositions are 
depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Diagram of the Model  
C. THE VARIABLES 
1. The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this thesis is the outcome of a BPC effort, which the 
thesis divides into two distinct and definitive possibilities. The first possible outcome of 
the model is a “client achieved military victory.” The thesis defines a client’s military 
victory as being synonymous with the BPC sponsor achieving its desired end state for the 
BPC relationship. Outcomes in this category are based on two assumptions. First, the 
model assumes that if the BPC client was militarily victorious then the BPC sponsor also 
achieved its desired end state. Second, the model only identifies the BPC client as 
victorious if the client was able to “comprehensively defeat or eliminate the 
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opposition.”81 This outcome, which the thesis definitively annotates in the dataset, is the 
only one that this thesis recognizes as equating to “client achieved military victory.” 
The second possible outcome for the dependent variable is “client failed to 
achieve military victory.” The thesis has recorded any other conflict termination 
outcome, as an outcome other than a client’s military victory. For example, outcomes 
such as victory for the opposing side, “peace agreement,” “ceasefire agreement,” “low 
activity,” and “actor ceases to exist” are coded as “client failed to achieve military 
victory.”82 Many of these outcomes are ambiguous, and cannot provide enough fidelity 
to reliably assume them to ultimately have achieved the sponsor’s desired end state for 
the relationship; therefore, this thesis codes these outcomes as “client failed to achieve 
military victory.”  
2. Primary Variables of Interest 
The thesis investigates two primary variables of interest: the difference in culture 
between a BPC sponsor and client; and the difference in forms of government between a 
BPC sponsor and client. As Chapter II highlights, Hofstede et al., along with Spencer-
Oatey, stress the impact of culture on individual and collective actions as well as the 
interpretation of these actions.83 Of note, in his research on BPC, Michael Veneri also 
identifies the significance of culture in BPC efforts summarizing quite bluntly, that 
“culture matters.”84 However, measuring cultural differences is difficult, especially in 
quantitative analysis. The strong body of literature addressing the correlation between 
economic and cultural data, outlined in Chapter II, makes economic data, particularly 
GDP, a useful proxy variable to culture. Building on these observations, in order to 
measure cultural differences, this thesis uses the differences in sponsor and client log per 
                                                 
81 Joakim Kreutz, UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook v. 2–2015 (Uppsala, Sweden: 
Uppsala University, 2016), 3. 
82 Ibid., 2–4. 
83 Geert H. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values, 
Abridged ed., Cross-Cultural Research and Methodology Series (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984), 
5; Helen Spencer-Oatey, “What Is Culture? A Compilation of Quotations” (Warwick: University of 
Warwick, 2012), 4. 
84 Veneri, “The Partner Predicament,” 11. 
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capita GDP as a proxy for the differences between sponsor and client on Hofstede’s 
cultural dimension of power distance and individualism. The use of the log of per capita 
GDP prevents disparities in global GDP from skewing the model’s results. Additionally, 
the use of GDP data allows for further insight into the effects of national wealth on BPC 
efforts. 
As Chapter II discusses, Hermann highlights that much of the quantitative 
analysis regarding BPC has merely identified that the more similar a client is to its 
sponsor, the better propensity for success.85 This thesis approaches the analysis of BPC 
from the opposite direction. Instead of asking how similarities make the BPC effort more 
likely to succeed, it examines how differences affect the outcome.  
The second primary variable of interest is the difference in sponsor and client 
forms of government. The model includes this variable because analysts and planners 
often consider the type of government such an important factor in international 
relationships. As Chapter II highlights, Hodges and Roland found that when choosing 
partner units, it is important to assess the relationship the unit’s leader has with both the 
populace of the local area and with the ruling government.86 Similarly, RAND has 
explored the effects of government types on stability operations and BPC.87 While both 
of these research efforts have sought to understand the effects of the indigenous 
government on a BPC effort, they have not analyzed the impact of differences in 
governmental types between a sponsor and client on BPC efforts.  
This thesis uses polity scores, which are scaled values assigned to a country’s 
specific form of government drawn from the Center for Systemic Peace Polity Dataset, to 
measure quantitatively the differences between sponsor and client governments.88 The 
Center for Systemic Peace Polity Dataset assigns a numerical value to a spectrum of 
                                                 
85 William Hermann, “Choosing to Win: How SOF Can Better Select Partner Forces for Capacity 
Building,” v. 
86 David Hodges and Robert Rowland, “Finding the Right Indigenous Leader and Force for 
Counterinsurgency Operations.” 
87 Marquis, ed., Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations. 
88 “Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015 Dataset.” 
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governmental types. These scores range, in whole numbers, from a full democracy (10) to 
a full autocracy (-10).89 This score is then used as a proxy for what is normally 
considered highly qualitative data. This is an important variable to include in the model 
because scholars often group governments by their type.  
The governance variable matters because one may assume that sponsors with a 
strongly democratic government will have more success building partner capacity with 
clients that also have strongly democratic governments. This would be akin to the United 
States (10) conducting BPC operations with countries like Costa Rica (10), or the 
Philippines (8). This same assumption could be taken a step further, and posit that the 
United States would be less successful conducting BPC operations with countries having 
a more autocratic style of government. An example of this would be the United States 
(10) conducting BPC operations with Tajikistan (-3), or the United Arab Emirates (-8). 
This thesis examines further whether or not a difference in regime type influences BPC 
success or failure.  
3. Secondary Variables of Interest 
This thesis further analyzes two secondary variables of interest: number of 
sponsors per year, and number of years of support by a sponsor to its client. In much of 
the BPC literature and in the policy world, the number of sponsors within a given state 
per year is one of the most studied variables in BPC success or failure. Many 
practitioners consider multinational efforts as the hallmark of legitimacy in international 
intervention. Additionally, multinational efforts, in theory, spread the burden of financial 
costs and national sacrifices among a coalition’s members. For example, in his opening 
comments of the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama wrote, 
“Abroad, we are demonstrating that while we will act unilaterally against threats to our 
core interests, we are stronger when we mobilize collective action.”90 The word “partner” 
is mentioned seventy-one times in the document. While qualitatively the number of 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 “National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015). 
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sponsors seems to be of the utmost importance, this thesis examines what effect the 
number of sponsors has on BPC efforts specifically.  
In addition to the number of sponsors, this thesis also examines the cumulative 
effect of the years of a sponsor’s support to a client. As Chapter II discusses, many 
researchers consider commitment, consistency, and continuity to be pillars of BPC 
success. Heisler, Terry, and Cabahug all mention elements of long-term support as 
central to BPC effectiveness.91 To examine this aspect of conventional BPC wisdom, this 
thesis measures the effect of the sum of the sponsor’s years of support to a given client on 
the outcome of the BPC. Similar to each of the other primary and secondary variables of 
interest, the thesis will examine the number of years of support quantitatively.  
4. Sponsor-Specific Cultural and Political Conditions 
In addition to focusing on variables between the client and sponsor, this thesis 
investigates variables found outside of the sponsor-client relationship that may influence 
BPC efforts. Specifically, the thesis accounts for two control variables regarding the 
sponsor. First, using the sponsor’s log per capita GDP, the proposed model controls for 
national wealth of the sponsor. This inclusion allows the model to account for the 
possibility that sponsors with higher wealth are more likely to succeed in BPC efforts. 
Second, the model accounts for the sponsor’s form of government using the sponsor’s 
polity score found in the Center for Systemic Peace Polity Dataset. Similar to national 
wealth, certain forms of government may be inherently more (or less) likely to succeed in 
BPC efforts. These control variables are distinct from the primary variables of interest in 
that the control variables focus specifically on the sponsor’s values (for log per capita 
GDP and polity score), rather than the difference in values between the sponsor and 
client. 
                                                 
91 Heisler, “By, With, and Through”; Terry, “Principles of Building Partnership Capacity”; Cabahug, 
“SOF Joint Combined Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective.”  
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The thesis includes these control variables in the analysis in order to account for 
Barnett’s “Core-Gap Model.”92 Essentially, this inclusion prevents the relative wealth 
and capability of the “functioning core” from skewing the analysis of the variables of 
interest. While the effects of the sponsor’s wealth and culture on BPC efforts would be 
interesting, analysis of these specific variables is outside the scope of this thesis. The 
inclusion of these variables, rather, is designed to ensure the primary and secondary 
variables of interest are examined in the most controlled manner.  
5. Types of BPC Support 
While this thesis focuses primarily on the effect cultural and governmental 
differences have on BPC efforts, it cannot do this without accounting for certain factors 
associated with BPC. When considering the dynamics of BPC efforts, Theater Special 
Operation Command planners often focus on the types of support each client should 
receive. To account for this, the thesis uses ten categorical variables, valued at either 0 or 
1, related to various types of external support: troops, access to territory, access to 
infrastructure, weapons, materiel and logistics, training, funding, intelligence, other forms 
of support, and support unknown. Essentially, these variables indicate if a specific type of 
support was present or absent in the BPC effort. Similar to conditions associated with the 
sponsor, the model includes these ten variables in order to assess the primary and 
secondary variables of interest while accounting for other factors that may influence the 





                                                 
92 Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. 
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Table 1.   Independent Variable Summary Chart 
Independent Variable 
Name Brief Description 
Difference in Sponsor-
Client Log Per Capita 
GDP 
This economic data is a proxy to measure the differences in 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of power distance and 
individualism between the sponsor and client.93 
Difference in Sponsor-
Client Form of 
Government 
The difference between the sponsor’s polity score, and the 
client’s polity score. These scores, which are a scaled value 
assigned to a country’s specific form of government, are 
drawn from the Center for Systemic Peace Polity Dataset.94 
Number of Sponsors per 
Client 
The sum of the number of sponsors providing support to a 
single client in a given year. 
Number of Years 
Sponsor-Client Support 
The sum of the cumulative years of support a client received 
from a given sponsor. 
Sponsor Log Per Capita 
GDP 
This accounts for the possibility that sponsors with higher 
national wealth are more successful at BPC.95 
Sponsor Form of 
Government 
The sponsor’s polity score, as drawn from the Center for 
Systemic Peace Polity Dataset.96 This accounts for the 
possibility that sponsors with a specific form of government 
are more successful at BPC. 
Troops Indicates whether or not the sponsor sent troops to fight 
alongside the client. This is different than troops sent in a non-
fighting role.97 
Access to Territory Indicates whether or not the sponsor provided territory for the 
client to operate from or stage out of.98 
Access to Infrastructure Indicates whether or not the sponsor allowed the client to use 
the sponsor’s military or intelligence infrastructure.99  
Weapons Indicates whether or not the sponsor provided the client with 
weapons. This includes providing personnel as technicians in 
support of weapon’s maintenance.100 
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Name Brief Description 
Materiel and Logistics Indicates whether or not the sponsor provided the client with 
non-lethal supplies. This includes providing personnel as 
technicians in support of non-lethal equipment 
maintenance.101 
Training Indicates whether or not the sponsor provided the client with 
trainers who remained in a non-combat role.102 
Funding Indicates whether or not the sponsor provided the client with 
funding used for the conduct of armed conflict.103 
Intelligence Indicates whether or not the sponsor provided the client with 
intelligence obtained by the sponsor.104  
Other Forms of Support Indicates whether or not the sponsor provided definitive 
support not covered in one of the other variables, such as 
recruiting opportunities or “intermediating transfers of 
weaponry.”105 
Support Unknown Indicates that researchers were able to find “reliable talk of 
support but do not specify of what type.”106  
D. FORMULATIONS 
This thesis uses logistic regression modeling to analyze the relationship between 
the primary and secondary variables of interest and a BPC outcome. Researchers use 
logistic regression modeling to predict the probability of an outcome with two possible 
results by analyzing the effects of one or more predictor variables. To achieve this, the 
thesis employs two models. First, “Model I” examines the relationship between the 
variables of interest and the outcome within the confines of a linear relationship. The 
second, “Model II,” allows for a curvilinear relationship, demonstrating a more dynamic 
relationship. More information on summary statistics can be found in the Appendix.  
 
 
                                                 




105 Ibid., 17. 
106 Ibid. 
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Equation 1, Model I (Linear Relationship) 
 
ܱݑݐܿ݋݉݁ ൌ ߙ଴ 	൅ ߙଵ	∆ log ݌݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ	ܩܦܲ ൅ ߙଶ	ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎ log ݌݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ	ܩܦܲ൅ ߙଷ	∆	ܲ݋݈݅ݐݕ ൅ ߙସ	ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎ	ܲ݋݈݅ݐݕ ൅	ߙହ	ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ൅ ߙ଺	ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܻ݁ܽݎݏ	ܵݑ݌݌݋ݎݐ ൅	ߙ଻	ܶݎ݋݋݌ݏ ൅	ߙ଼	ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ	ݐ݋	ܶ݁ݎݎ݅ݐ݋ݎݕ൅ ߙଽ	ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ	ݐ݋	ܫ݂݊ݎܽݏݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁ ൅	ߙଵ଴	ܹ݁ܽ݌݋݊ݏ൅	ߙଵଵ	ܯܽݐ݁ݎ݈݅ܽ	ܽ݊݀	ܮ݋݃݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ ൅ ߙଵଶ	ܶݎܽ݅݊݅݊݃	ߙଵଷ	ܨݑ݊݀݅݊݃൅	ߙଵସ	ܫ݊ݐ݈݈݁݅݃݁݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߙଵହ	ܱݐ݄݁ݎ	݂݋ݎ݉ݏ	݋݂	ܵݑ݌݌݋ݎݐ൅ ߙଵ଺	ܵݑ݌݌݋ݎݐ	ܷ݊݇݊݋ݓ݊ ൅	ߝଵ	
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E. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis posits four hypotheses about the variables of interest and their effects 
on the models’ outcomes based on assumptions and observations found in qualitative 
BPC literature, as well as on personal anecdotal experience in conducting BPC operations 
in the field. As with the variables described above, these hypotheses center on the 
outcome for the BPC client: 
1. Hypothesis 1 
Building on the assertion by Hofstede et al. that organizations that are similar in 
national wealth (and thus similar in power distance and individualism) will have an easier 
time developing an effective relationship, hypothesis one posits:  An increase in the 
difference of log per capita GDP between the sponsor and client will lower the 
probability of BPC success. Conversely, a decrease in the difference of log per capita 
GDP between a BPC sponsor and BPC client will raise the probability of a BPC success.  
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2. Hypothesis 2  
Qualitative literature on BPC asserts that long-term sponsor commitment will 
increase the probability of BPC success. Hypothesis two therefore posits: The longer the 
time commitment of the sponsor to the client, the greater the probability of BPC success. 
Conversely, the shorter the time commitment of the sponsor to the client, the lesser the 
probability of BPC success.  
3. Hypothesis 3 
Coalitions, partnerships, and alliances are the cornerstone of U.S. National 
Security Strategy and National Military Strategy and provide an additional layer of 
legitimacy to BPC efforts as well as more resources. Therefore: the greater the number of 
sponsors, the higher the probability of BPC success; conversely, the fewer the number of 
sponsors, the lower the probability of BPC success. 
4. Hypothesis 4 
Similar to hypothesis one, this hypothesis postulates that sponsors and clients with 
similar government structures will have an easier time developing an effective 
relationship. As an example, heavily democratic sponsors will have a higher probability 
of success in their BPC efforts with democratic clients than with autocratic clients. 
Therefore: the greater the differences in government types between client and sponsor, 
the lower the probability of BPC success; conversely, the lesser the difference in 
government types, the greater the probability of BPC success. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an overview of the models this thesis uses to analyze BPC 
relationships and programs. It highlighted the use of modeling in previous conflict 
research, and introduced the primary and secondary variables of interest associated with 
this research effort: difference in sponsor and client culture, difference in sponsor and 
client forms of government, number of sponsors per year, and number of years sponsor 
has supported the client.  
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The chapter also underscored the variables that the thesis uses to account for 
socio-economic conditions specific to the sponsor, as well as the variables the thesis 
utilizes to account for various forms of support. Lastly, the chapter provided a brief 
overview of the logistics regression models that this thesis employs to analyze BPC. 
Building on the logistics regression models, this chapter concluded by introducing the 
four hypotheses this thesis tests with logistics regression.  
Chapter IV will discuss the results of the two logistics regression models, as well 
as what inferences can be drawn from them. Following a review of the results, Chapter 
IV will review the thesis’ four hypotheses, and discuss any implications the results of the 
regression may have on them. Lastly, Chapter IV will briefly review both the receiver 
operating characteristic curve and Bayesian model averaging—two statistical methods 
that are employed to demonstrate the robustness and strength of the BPC model.  
 
 43
IV. THE EFFECTS OF CULTURE, COMMITMENT, AND 
CONSENSUS ON BPC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, big data analysis has emerged as a means to measure 
success in marketing research and other business endeavors. Commercial firms are now 
able to conduct regressions on, and apply algorithms to, massive datasets, which enables 
them to identify opportunities and streamline processes. Simply put, big data provides 
insights at the macro level by identifying trends in thousands, hundreds of thousands, and 
even millions of data points.  
This thesis uses big data analysis to better understand the conditions that lead to 
success in building partnership capacity (BPC). Specifically, this thesis tests 131,072 
configurations of a model that uses over 30,000 data points divided into 1,873 
observations to gain a fresh perspective on BPC. As described in Chapter III, the thesis 
draws from several conflict-related datasets to create a composite dataset specifically 
focused on BPC efforts across the globe. This composite dataset allows for the 
employment of the same techniques data analysts have applied in commercial endeavors 
to gain insights into issues associated with BPC.  
This chapter uses the models, introduced in Chapter III, to examine variables 
that lead to BPC success, which it defines as the client achieving military victory. The 
chapter begins with an introduction and brief overview of the regression results, 
including the analysis of both the primary and secondary variables of interest, as well as a 
discussion on the explanatory strength of Model II over Model I. The chapter then reveals 
the findings of the thesis’ hypotheses introduced in Chapter III. The chapter concludes by 
describing the statistical method the thesis uses to check the predictive accuracy of 
the model, the statistical method used to explore alternate explanations for the effects 
of the inputs (independent variables) on Model II’s outcome, as well as the limits to the 
selected model.  
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B. MAIN RESULTS 
Model II reveals an interesting dynamic between the outcome of BPC efforts and 
the primary variables of interest, which are the difference in sponsor-client power 
distance and individualism, as well as difference in sponsor-client forms of government. 
First, with regard to difference in sponsor-client power distance and individualism, 
Model II demonstrates that, generally, the more disparate the cultures are, the less likely 
the BPC sponsor-client pairing will achieve success. There are some exceptions to this 
finding, discussed in depth later in this chapter. 
This finding is, perhaps, not surprising. Two examples that illustrate the effects of 
differences in culture on BPC are the U.S. military’s and NATO’s BPC efforts in 
Hungary and Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As is indicated in 
Table 2, in Hungary, U.S. trainers, along with their NATO counterparts, worked with a 
culture with similar power distance and individualism scores to the United States:107 
Table 2.   United States-Hungary Culture Difference Chart 
 
 
These cultural similarities facilitated the introduction of concepts such as the 
delegation of authority and distributed decision making, which then enabled the creation 
of an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. At the 2011 Conference of 
European Armies for Noncommissioned Officers, Hungarian Command Sergeant Major 
Lazlo Toth noted, “Twenty-five years ago, the [Hungarian] army reflected the Soviet 
style. Everything was in the officers’ hands … [Now] NCOs have power as leaders. That 
                                                 
107 “Geert Hofstede Country Comparison Tool,” accessed August 30, 2016, https://geert-
hofstede.com/united-states.html. 
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means they have to accept the responsibility that comes with that power.”108 Hungarian 
noncommissioned officers now find themselves serving a more significant role in the 
operations and administration of their country’s armed forces—a role that was most 
likely assumed as a result of Hungarian culture and its similarities to U.S. culture, 
particularly in power distance and individualism.  
Conversely, as indicated in Table 3, Ukraine has a much different set of power 
distance and individualism scores than the United States:109 
Table 3.   United States-Ukraine Culture Difference Chart 
 
 
These differences suggest that the United States, along with NATO forces, will 
likely find it more difficult to introduce concepts such as decentralized operations or the 
empowerment of subordinates.110 As with Hungary, NATO forces have attempted to 
create an NCO corps. However, a news release notes that, “For [Ukrainian] NCO reform 
to be a success, a number of legislative and structural changes should be introduced and 
substantial work is on-going in this area with support from Ukraine’s Minister of Defence 
[sic] and the Chief of Staff.”111 NATO recognizes the difficulties associated with 
introducing an NCO system into the Ukrainian military, and in doing so is learning to 
                                                 
108 “The United States Army in Europe,” accessed August 30, 2016, 
http://www.eur.army.mil/news/archive2011/features/06072011_internationalNCO.htm. 
109 “Geert Hofstede Country Comparison Tool.” 
110 “Dimensions– Geert Hofstede,” accessed June 2, 2016, https://geert-hofstede.com/national-
culture.html. 
111 “NATO– News: Building a Corps of Professional Non-Commissioned Officers in Ukraine, 18-
Apr.-2016,” accessed August 30, 2016, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_129998.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
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navigate the differences in cultural dimensions between the NATO sponsors and their 
Ukrainian client. 
Unfortunately, Model II does not reveal a statistically significant finding with 
regard to differences in forms of government. As Chapter II notes, a review of the 
qualitative body of literature regarding BPC as well as the authors’ own experiences 
suggest that the more similar a sponsor and client are in their governmental type, for 
example democratic or autocratic, the more likely the pairing would achieve success. 
This is noteworthy because forms of government are important factors when policy 
makers, defense planners, and special operations activity coordinators develop country 
and regional engagement plans. President Obama noted this in the 2015 National Security 
Strategy, stating, “Underpinning it all [2015 National Security Strategy], we are 
upholding our enduring commitment to the advancement of democracy and human 
rights.”112 In other words, a special operations planner would likely assume that it would 
be easier for the United States, a full democracy according to the Center for Systemic 
Peace (CSP), to build an effective BPC relationship with the Republic of Korea, a 
democracy according to the CSP, than with Vietnam, an autocracy according to the 
CSP.113 Model II, however, cannot confirm or deny this assumption.  
Regarding the secondary variables of interest, number of sponsors per client and 
number of years of sponsor-client support, Model II reveals two fascinating, and 
unexpected, findings. First, regarding number of sponsors per client, Model II finds that, 
the more sponsors involved with a single client, the less likely the client will achieve 
success. This finding is significant because, according to the 2015 U.S. National Security 
Strategy, “In an interconnected world, there are no global problems that can be solved 
without the United States, and few that can be solved by the United States alone.”114 In 
other words, this finding runs contrary to long-held beliefs regarding the political and 
military importance of international alliances and cooperation in maintaining global 
                                                 
112 “National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015). 
113 “Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015 Dataset.” 
114 “National Security Strategy,” (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), 3. 
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security.115 Model II’s findings suggest that coalitions actually impede BPC success, 
not help it.  
A review of recent U.S.-led BPC partnerships reveals, however, that the finding 
that coalitions are more problematic than helpful to BPC success should not be 
unexpected. For example, in the months and years following September 11, 2001, the 
U.S. Government, along with its allies, spent a great deal of time, money and effort 
conducting combined BPC efforts with Afghan security forces through the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF struggled with unity of command, including 
having to account for each country’s political requirements, differing command 
structures, as well as varying capabilities, equipment, and experience.116 All of these 
factors made the successful execution of coordinated BPC operations in Afghanistan 
challenging.  
Today, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are part of 
Operation Resolute Support, which NATO launched after the stand-down of ISAF in 
2015.117 The NATO website dedicated to Operation Resolute Support lists 39 
contributing countries, with the United States, Germany, and Italy providing the three 
largest troop contributions.118 With the ANDSF constantly working towards national 
legitimacy, fighting a resurgent Taliban, and dealing with the introduction of ISIL to the 
battlefield, Afghanistan remains an extremely challenging environment in which to 
conduct BPC. It is also unlikely that this complex BPC effort will come to a close in the 
near future. As John Sopko, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction noted in 2016, “Without the strong monitoring and mentoring arm of U.S. 
                                                 
115 Mark Thornhill, “Coalition Warfare: The Leadership Challenges” (Monograph, School of 
Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2010). 
116 Ibid. 
117 “USCENTCOM | Resolute Support,” accessed August 30, 2016, 
http://www.centcom.mil/OPERATIONS-AND-EXERCISES/RESOLUTE-SUPPORT//. 
118 “News | Resolute Support Mission,” accessed August 30, 2016, http://www.rs.nato.int/troop-
numbers-and-contributions/index.php. 
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and Coalition troops to help, it is increasingly unlikely they [the ANDSF] will develop 
into a robust and sustainable force.”119  
Conversely, U.S. efforts in another theater of the Global War on Terrorism, the 
Philippines, were much less complex. From the beginning, Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines (OEF-P) was a smaller effort than operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.120 While 
the support of Japan, Australia, and at times Malaysia,121 gave political credibility to 
OEF-P, the limited involvement of other countries reduced many of the issues that 
emerged with the larger coalition in Afghanistan. In the end, the U.S. military 
successfully partnered with Philippine forces to reduce insurgent activity in the southern 
archipelago, including the regions of Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi.122 Comparing BPC 
successes in the Philippines with the challenges in Afghanistan have some important 
limitations. Most notably, the United States did not have to build security forces from 
scratch in the Philippines as it did in Afghanistan. The differences, however, do not 
overshadow the tactical benefits the BPC effort in the Philippines enjoyed from fewer 
sponsors being involved.  
Lastly, Model II demonstrates that the longer a sponsor supports a client the 
less likely it is the client will achieve success; this finding is also counterintuitive to 
qualitative literature on BPC. The conventional wisdom in the literature is that, the 
longer the relationship, the greater the chance of success in BPC; the results of Model II 
directly contradict this assumption. As a result, this thesis reviews this finding in depth in 
the hypotheses section of this chapter as well as in the recommendations section of 
Chapter VI.  
 
                                                 
119 John Sopko, “SIGAR Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives,” Testimony (Washington, DC: Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, February 12, 2016), 14. 
120 Hy S Rothstein, “Less Is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of 
Collapsing States,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (March 2007): 284, doi:10.1080/01436590601153663. 
121 Peter Brookes, “Flashpoint: No Bungle in the Jungle,” Armed Forces Journal, September 1, 2007, 
http://armedforcesjournal.com/flashpoint-no-bungle-in-the-jungle/. 
122 Linda Robinson et al., U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), xviii. 
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C. REVIEW OF MODELS  
The thesis draws its analysis from Model II, as opposed to Model I, because 
Model II better accounts for the dynamic relationships between cultural differences and 
BPC outcomes. Both regression results from Model I and II are displayed in Table 4. In 
addition, as is indicated in Table 4, Model II has the lower Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) score.123 This finding confirms the relative quality of Model II over Model I. In 
other words, Model II better explains the relationship between the primary and secondary 














                                                 
123 AIC: “Criterion, introduced by Akaike in 1969, for choosing between competing statistical 
models. For categorical data this amounts to choosing the model that minimizes G2–2v, where G2 is the 
likelihood-ratio goodness-of-fit statistic v is the number of degrees of freedom associated with the model.” 
Graham J. G. Upton and Ian Cook, eds., Oxford Dictionary of Statistics, Oxford Paperback Reference 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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Difference in Sponsor-Client Log per capita GDP -0.287** (0.125) 1.331*** (0.406) 
Difference in Sponsor-Client Log per capita GDP 
(squared)  -0.354
*** (0.089) 
Sponsor Log per capita GDP 0.165 (0.131) 0.228 (0.144) 
Difference in Sponsor-Client Form of Government 0.034 (0.028) 0.025 (0.028) 
Sponsor Form of Government 0.013 (0.025) 0.001 (0.026) 
Number of Sponsors per Client -0.016** (0.007) -0.020*** (0.008) 
Number of Years Sponsor-Client Support -0.072* (0.039) -0.077* (0.040) 
Troops -0.667 (0.512) -0.571 (0.522) 
Access to Territory 0.581 (0.575) 0.821 (0.588) 
Access to Infrastructure 2.172*** (0.480) 2.005*** (0.497) 
Weapons -0.594 (0.566) -0.829 (0.584) 
Materiel and Logistics -0.393 (0.507) -0.395 (0.523) 
Training 0.266 (0.431) 0.156 (0.445) 
Funding -17.011 (773.780) -17.065 (758.367)
Intelligence 0.797 (0.886) 0.787 (0.919) 
Other Forms of Support -1.514 (0.981) -1.771* (0.981) 
Support Unknown 3.554*** (0.652) 3.763*** (0.697) 
Constant -3.747*** (1.095) -5.163*** (1.237) 
Observations 1,873 1,873 
Log Likelihood -213.554 -203.380 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 461.107 442.761 
Notes: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
D. HYPOTHESES  
Chapter III proposed four testable hypotheses regarding the conditions that 
improve, or hinder, BPC success. The results of Model II on each of the hypotheses are 
summarized below.  
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1. Hypothesis 1 
An increase in the difference of log per capita GDP, as a proxy for power 
distance and individualism, between the sponsor and client will lower the probability of 
BPC success. Conversely, a decrease in the difference of log per capita GDP, as a proxy 
for power distance and individualism, between a BPC sponsor and BPC client will raise 
the probability of a BPC success. 
a. Findings Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis one is partially confirmed. As is demonstrated in Figure 2, the greater 
the difference in log per capita GDP, the lower the probability of success for the client. 
This finding, however, does not account for the low likelihood of BPC success for 
observations on the far left side of the x-axis (Difference in Power Distance and 
Individualism). Because the x-axis represents the sponsor-client difference in power 
distance and individualism, using log per capita GDP as a proxy, the far left side of the x-
axis is reserved for BPC pairings that are highly similar in these primary variables of 
interest. The further to the right the observations move along the x-axis, the greater the 
difference in sponsor-client power distance and individualism. As such, there is an 
interesting dynamic at play in the curve illustrated in Figure 2.  
The far left side of the x-axis, which illustrates a lower likelihood of BPC success, 
results from BPC pairings of sponsors and clients with similar log per capita GDPs, as 
well as similar power distance and individualism scores. An example that may help to 
illustrate this point is African Union troops assisting with military training in a 
neighboring state. While the sponsor may be able to offer tactical assistance and 
manpower, its own limitations may prevent it from building any real capacity in the 
client. Simply put, sponsors and clients with similar power distance and individualism 
scores, as well as similar log per capita GDPs, are less likely to improve capacity in the 
client’s military through BPC efforts. With these shared variables, sponsors and clients 
are cultural and economic peers. This thesis refers to this phenomenon as the “near-peer” 
effect. 
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Another important finding from this hypothesis is that, as the difference in power 
distance and individualism continues to grow—with the observations moving to the right 
along the x-axis—a spike in the likelihood of success occurs before it begins to decrease. 
This spike suggests that there is a certain threshold of economic and cultural difference 
that gives room for improvement by the client, but not such a gap that the sponsor is 
unable to relate to the client and provide meaningful support.  
Ultimately, these results indicate that there is an ideal difference in log per capita 
GDP (and thus power-distance and individualism) that a sponsor should consider when 
selecting BPC clients. When sponsors support clients with similar log per capita GDPs it 
may be difficult for them to provide meaningful support because sponsors may be unable 
to offer anything culturally, such as improved military organization or training, or 
economically that could improve the client’s situation. Likewise, sponsors should 
consider the effects of selecting clients with significantly different log per capita GDPs 
because they will be less likely to experience success in these endeavors. In other words, 
GDP between client and sponsor functions like a bell curve, with too similar or too 
different log GDP inhibiting BPC success, and the ideal difference in the middle.  
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b. Results Hypothesis 1  
 
Figure 2.  Regression of Difference in Power Distance and Individualism 
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2. Hypothesis 2 
The longer the time commitment of the sponsor to the client, the greater the 
probability of BPC success. Conversely, the shorter the time commitment of the sponsor 
to the client, the lesser the probability of BPC success. 
a. Findings Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis two was not confirmed. As demonstrated in Figure 3, Model II 
actually reveals the opposite effect; the longer a sponsor-client relationship continues in a 
given conflict, the less probable the sponsor-client pairing is to achieving its desired end 
state. This finding, however, may be the result of an overall lack of success in prolonged 
conflict and not just of the BPC effort. The mean length of conflict for the dataset used in 
this thesis is 4.48 years. Therefore, the reduction in probability of BPC success is likely 
explained by the effects of protracted conflicts on clients. In other words, the longer the 
conflict goes on, the more likely it is to end in a peace agreement, stalemate, or loss, and 
the less likely it will end in military victory, which is the definition of BPC success used 
in this thesis.  
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b. Results Hypothesis 2  
 
Figure 3.  Regression of Number of Years of Sponsor-Client Support 
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3. Hypothesis 3 
The greater the number of sponsors, the higher the probability of BPC success; 
conversely, the fewer the number of sponsors, the lower the probability of BPC success. 
a. Findings Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis three is not confirmed. As is illustrated in Figure 4, the model reveals 
the opposite relationship between the number of sponsors and the probability of success. 
This finding may be because of the reasons introduced in the previous section: the more 
sponsors that are involved in a conflict, the more complicated the management of each 
sponsor-client relationship to the BPC effort. As discussed, while the presence of 
multiple sponsors often lends strategic legitimacy to an operation, it appears it may 
complicate tactical operations, and ultimately have a detrimental effect on the overall 
success of the BPC sponsor-client relationship, which is military victory. 
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b. Results Hypothesis 3 
 
Figure 4.  Regression of Number of Sponsors per Client 
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4. Hypothesis 4 
The greater the differences in government types between client and sponsor, the 
lower the probability of BPC success; conversely, the lesser the difference in government 
types, the greater the probability of BPC success.  
a. Findings Hypothesis 4 
The regression results indicate that the data provided are not sufficient to identify 
a significant statistical relationship between a difference in sponsor-client form of 
government and the success of a BPC effort. Anecdotal observations and qualitative 
literature suggest that governmental alignment would support BPC efforts, but Model II 
fails to confirm or deny that observation.  
Model II may fail to demonstrate a statistically significant finding in reference to 
the differences in forms or sponsor and client government because of the basic numeric 
scale the thesis employs to measure governmental differences. This thesis employs scaled 
scores from the Center of Systemic Peace known as polity scores, which assign numeric 
values from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). This is a simple scale that may 
not capture the complexities of governmental systems found across the globe. The failure 
to draw a conclusive finding regarding differences in forms of government highlights the 
importance of this topic for future BPC research efforts.  
E. ACCURACY OF THE MODEL 
In order to verify the accuracy of the above findings, this thesis performs several 
additional mathematical tests on Model II. First, this thesis employs a receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) curve to diagnostically test the accuracy of Model II, and confirm 
the value of including the primary and secondary variables of interest in the analysis.124 
As seen in Figure 5, each ROC curve plotted provides an area under the curve (AUC) 
                                                 
124 ROC Curve: “The relationship between the correct “yes” responses and the proportion of incorrect 
“yes” responses. That information is then plotted as a curve to determine the effect the observer response 
criteria is having on the results.” “What Is Receiver Operating Curve? (Psychology Dictionary),” 
Psychology Dictionary, accessed August 22, 2016, http://psychologydictionary.org/receiver-operating-
characteristic-curve-roc-curve/. 
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statistic, which Warren notes, “…represents a measure of the overall predictive accuracy 
of each model.”125 In other words, the ROC curve provides an indication of how many 
times a model postulates an accurate prediction.  
As noted by the higher AUC, the inclusion of the primary variables provides a 
more predictive model, indicating their usefulness in BPC planning and assessment. 
Many special operations planners would argue that the types of support provided most 
strongly influence the outcome of a BPC operation, such as training, weapons, or troops 
support. The ROC analysis, however, demonstrates the value of also considering this 
thesis’ primary and secondary variables of interest in BPC efforts as well. Specifically, 
Model II’s AUC statistic indicates the importance of considering culture, the number of 
sponsors, and the current cumulative years of sponsor-client support when planning 
future BPC proposals or assessing current BPC operations.  
                                                 
125 T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of 




Figure 5.  ROC Analysis 
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F. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS 
Second, within the framework of traditional regression analysis, there is always 
a concern that investigators may have selectively “cherry-picked” their model and 
variables to prove their given hypothesis—a sort of statistical reverse engineering. To 
check for this possibility, this thesis employs a process known as Bayesian model 
averaging (BMA). Through BMA, this thesis seeks to ensure that the regression results 
are not unduly influenced by Model II’s design, and that the thesis did not manipulate 
variables. BMA develops a model for every possible independent variable combination, 
ranging from two to all sixteen independent variables. Then BMA assesses the value 
of including or omitting each independent variable in each of the tested models. 
Following this analysis, BMA indicates the most predictive independent variables and 
variable combinations.  
Ultimately, the use of BMA enables the most honest assessment of results from 
across the range of plausible models given the inputs presented in the thesis. Specifically, 
the thesis uses BMA to test all 131,072 variations of the model by including or excluding 
independent variables. This check is important for both testing the robustness and 
confirming the real-world applicability of the model. To illustrate this point, a 10 percent 
sample of the total BMA iterations is depicted in Figure 6.  
 62
 
Figure 6.  BMA Results: 10 Percent Sample of Total Iterations 
As depicted in Figure 6, BMA testing reveals two of the thesis’ variables of 
interest and two of the thesis’ support variables to be the most useful in providing 
accurate results. Specifically, the difference in sponsor-client power distance and 
individualism, and the number of sponsors have proven to be the most valuable 
variable of interest for explaining BPC success. Of the support type variables, access 
to infrastructure and funding have the greatest explanatory power in predicting 
BPC success.  
Furthermore, the BMA analysis demonstrates that two support type variables, 
access to infrastructure, such as bases, as well as funding, to be more consistently 
predictive than the primary and secondary variables of interest. The high number of times 
in which both access to infrastructure (12,082 times) and funding (10,996 times) appear 
in the BMA analysis statistics is indicative of their importance in Model II, relative to the 
other independent variables. Specifically, of the 131,072 possible model combinations, 
ranked by statistical significance, access to infrastructure is included more often than any 
other independent variable. Access to infrastructure occurs when a sponsor allows a 
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client “to use some part of their military infrastructure (bases, intelligence gathering 
stations, etc.) as if it was their own.”126 An example of this was U.S.-Peruvian 
coordination during the counternarcotics Airbridge Denial Program (1995–2001). As part 
of this program, U.S. CIA personnel acted as both pilots and sensor operators for a 
tracker plane. At the same time, a Peruvian official on the plane acted as the link between 
the tracker plane and Peruvian fighter aircraft. When the Peruvian forces had met the 
conditions for an interdiction, their fighter aircraft—using the information provided to 
them by the Peruvian official on the tracker aircraft—engaged the target.127 
After access to infrastructure, funding is included the most of any other 
independent variable. Appearing the third most is the difference in power distance and 
individualism (appearing 8,657 times), and the fourth is the number of sponsors per client 
(appearing 6,571 times). The most significant implication from this analysis is that, in a 
time-constrained environment, planners should consider funding, access to the sponsor’s 
infrastructure, the difference in power distance and individualism, and the number of 
sponsors when planning or assessing BPC efforts. These points will be further discussed 
in Chapter VI.  
G. LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL 
In data analysis involving thousands of observations, researchers must apply 
limits within the bounds of feasible and necessary assumptions. While Chapter III 
highlights the assumptions the thesis employs in defining the dependent variable of the 
model, additional assumptions and limitations of the model require explanation.   
First, as Chapter I notes, this thesis focuses on BPC efforts that aim to strengthen 
a client’s military capability, and not BPC efforts that sponsors designed merely to 
maintain a relationship. As a result, the thesis has defined the dependent variable as 
whether or not the client achieved military victory in a given conflict. There are, of 
course, a myriad of outcomes that may be included in a client’s failure to achieve military 
                                                 
126 Croicu et al., UCDP External Support Project–Disaggregated/Supporter Dataset Codebook, 15. 
127 John L. Helgerson, Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995–2001 
(DTIC Document, 2008), 19. 
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victory, such as a ceasefire, peace agreement, or stalemate. This thesis, however, employs 
this strict dichotomous outcome to demonstrate clearly what factors most influence 
outright client military victory.   
Second, the time period associated with Model II (1975–2009) is one of its more 
obvious limitations. The thesis creates a composite dataset that draws primarily from the 
UCDP External Support Dataset, which itself is limited to this thirty-four-year period. 
Despite its relatively short duration, this timeframe provides a broad pool of observations 
that includes Cold War and post-Cold War conflicts, ethnic and religious conflicts, as 
well as nationalist and ideological struggles. Furthermore, the dataset is geographically 
dispersed, providing information on conflicts from across the globe.    
Despite the breadth and depth of the UCDP External Support Dataset, readily 
available data has limited the findings of this thesis. Some of the UCDP data contains 
ambiguity regarding which parties were involved in a given conflict, or how a conflict 
was resolved. This thesis has culled observations of this type, which lack the preferred 
clarity, from the composite dataset.  
Perhaps the most significant limitation of the dataset is the simplification of 
support types to either present or absent. This is a limitation because it breaks the 
sponsor-client relationship into a series of dichotomies, and does not account for differing 
levels of support. For example, the dataset does not distinguish between the levels of 
training support provided by Estonia and the United States to Afghanistan during 
Operation Enduring Freedom. In the dataset, the presence of trainers is what matters, not 
the number of trainers. This limitation is rooted in the macro-level view of the UCDP 
datasets. There are simply too many conflict/sponsor-client/year observations to account 
for gradations in each support variable, in each sponsor-client pairing. 
This limitation, however, does not prevent the thesis from drawing valuable 
insights from the dataset. Specifically, the thesis principally draws findings on the 
primary and secondary variables of interest, and uses the support type variables as 
controls. Despite these insights, two important conclusions the thesis cannot draw from 
the regression are “support unknown” and “other forms of support,” both of which are 
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statistically significant in Model II, because of lack of clarity in the dataset. Information 
is limited on these two variables, restricting the findings that they may provide. In the 
observations where these two support type variables are found to be present, further 
research is required.  
H. CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced the results of the regression conducted on the thesis’ 
composite dataset. The chapter highlighted the results regarding the primary and 
secondary variables, noting that the difference in culture, the number of sponsors, and the 
number of years of sponsor-client support each proved to be statistically significant, 
while the difference in forms of government was not. This chapter also reviewed this 
thesis’ four hypotheses. Results from the analysis found that, generally, the bigger the 
difference in culture the less likely the sponsor is to achieve success, which partially 
confirmed hypothesis one. Conversely, the chapter did not confirm hypotheses two or 
three. It, instead, found that the more sponsors involved in a BPC effort and the longer 
the BPC effort goes on, the less likely a client is to achieve victory.  
After discussing the results and analysis of the regression, Chapter IV provided a 
brief overview of the two statistical methods the thesis employs to check the accuracy of 
the Model II, ROC and BMA, to explore alternate explanations for the effects of the 
inputs, or independent variables, on the model’s outcome. Model II, which includes the 
controls, secondary, and primary variables of interest, provided the most accurate 
predictive model. BMA analysis confirmed the significance of difference in culture and 
number of sponsors, but also found access to infrastructure and funding to be important 
considerations with regard to BPC.  
Chapter V will further explore the results and analysis of Model II using a unique 
case study: the Dhofar Rebellion (1965–1975) in Oman. The chapter will use this case 
study to highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and major insights Model II provides, while 
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V. THE DHOFAR REBELLION AND BPC 
A. OVERVIEW 
On July 23, 1970, the British government sponsored a palace coup d’état in 
Oman, replacing Sultan Taymur with his son, Sultan Qaboos, who continues to reign over 
Oman today. Since 1965, the Omani government had nominally, and without much 
success, been fighting a Marxist insurgency in the remote region of Dhofar. As the long-
time western sponsor of the Omani government, the British felt significant Cold War 
pressure to both defeat the spread of communism on the Arabian Peninsula, and to retain 
their waning influence in the region. The coup, however, was only the start. What 
followed was a significant BPC effort that built an army from the ground up in the midst 
of a major counterinsurgency campaign. Ultimately, the BPC efforts of the British 
succeeded in a military victory for their client against Marxist inspired, communist 
backed insurgents. The way in which the British sponsored the Omani government offers 
useful insights into the conditions that promote BPC success, as do the failed ways in 
which the Soviet Union and others backed the insurgents. 
This chapter provides a qualitative case study of the Dhofar Rebellion (1965–
1975) in Oman, with the aim of illustrating the findings on building partner capacity 
revealed in the primary model of the thesis outlined in Chapter III. Chapter V begins with 
a brief history of the Dhofar region of Oman, focusing specifically on the years 
immediately preceding the rebellion, as well as providing a timeline of the Dhofar 
Rebellion. The chapter then describes the sponsor-client relationships that existed on both 
sides of the conflict, including cultural considerations, types of support and duration. 
Building on all of this, this chapter concludes with an analysis of Chapter IV’s findings as 
they pertain to the Dhofar Rebellion.  
This chapter illustrates how the British, a major sponsor in the fight against the 
Dhofar Rebellion, leveraged Omani culture better than their adversaries to gain an 
advantage over the insurgents driving the conflict. The conflict also illustrates the value 
of early commitment, and the importance of funding. Notably, there was substantially 
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less funding provided by the Omani government for the BPC effort in the first half of the 
conflict (1965–1970) than the second half of the conflict (1970–1975). However, when 
the British and Sultan Qaboos increased funding against the rebel movement in the 
second half of the conflict, the BPC efforts began to show significant results. Lastly, and 
perhaps most uniquely, the conflict illustrates how the British not only allowed their 
client, the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF), to use British infrastructure, but also created a 
combined “inter-structure” that allowed the swift development and employment of the 
SAF to put down the rebellion.  
B. DHOFAR: THE RISE OF REBELLION  
Oman, a tiny sultanate on the Arabian Peninsula, has had a relationship with 
Britain dating back to the Anglo-Omani treaty of 1798.128 The Dhofar region of Oman is 
located in the most southwestern portion of the country, a region that is isolated from the 
rest of the Sultanate. It borders Saudi Arabia to the north, the Arabian Sea to the south, 
and Yemen to the west.129 Dhofar has three main areas: the fertile plain around the city of 
Salalah, the range of mountains known simply as the jebel,130 and the flat desert area 
known as the Najd.131  
Sultan Taymur, who reigned from 1932–1970, chose Salalah, the only major city 
in Dhofar, as his principal residence over the capital city of Muscat.132 Despite having 
the Sultan in residence, Dhofar was not officially part of Oman until 1970; rather, it was 
the personal property of the Sultan, over which he ruled much like a “feudal lord.”133 
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From his palace in Salalah, Sultan Taymur largely ran the rest of the country via radio-
telephone.134  
As a ruler, Sultan Taymur was isolated from much of the world and his own 
population. He maintained diplomatic relations with only three countries: the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Pakistan.135 In the early years of his reign, the Sultan 
paid off the debts of his predecessors, ultimately failing to spend sufficient funds on 
infrastructure or other development projects for the country.136 By 1969, the last full year 
of Sultan Taymur’s rule, Oman looked much as it had when he came to power almost 
four decades before. Ultimately, the isolation of the Sultan from both his people and the 
world, combined with the almost complete absence of modern development, made the 
country ripe for rebellion.137 
The first sparks of what would eventually become the Dhofar Rebellion date back 
to the late 1950s.138 Following a 1958 territorial dispute between Oman and Saudi Arabia 
over the Buraimi Oasis, the Saudis began sponsoring Sheikh Ghalib bin ‘Ali al-Hinai, a 
regional Imam. The Imam attempted to challenge Omani claims to Buraimi, and even 
applied to the Arab League to be recognized as an independent entity. The British helped 
Oman fend off Saudi Arabia diplomatically and backed the Sultan militarily. Eventually, 
these efforts enabled Oman to expel the Imam, who escaped with his followers to Saudi 
Arabia. The Sultan’s reliance on a foreign military to put down the uprising further 
undermined his already weak credibility with the Omani population.139  
During the 1960s, a variety of Omani nationalist groups organized into the 
Democratic Liberation Front (DLF) and established a training camp in al-Basra, Iraq. J. 
E. Peterson, a historian and political analyst specializing in the Arabian Peninsula and 
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Persian Gulf, notes that, “a series of minor raids were carried out against oil company 
installations in Dhufar [sic] during 1963 and 1964.”140 Middle East expert Fred Halliday 
describes the DLF’s ideology as a “mixture of Dhofari separatism and partial 
Nasserism.”141 Eventually, however, at the DLF’s second congress in 1968, the uprising 
in Dhofar was coopted by radical Marxists for their own purposes.142 With this change in 
ideology and leadership, the group became the People’s Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).143  
Sultan Taymur responded to the rise of the PFLOAG with a policy of repression. 
International relations expert Walter C. Ladwig III describes, “wells were cemented over, 
homes of suspected insurgents were burned, and civilians from the Jebel were denied 
access to the markets in the towns on the plain where they traditionally sold their 
livestock.”144 Rather than suppress the growing movement, the Sultan’s policies pushed 
the population of Dhofar further toward the rebel cause.  
Under these conditions, British efforts to build partner capacity under Sultan 
Taymur stalled. Ladwig observes: 
Following the suppression of the Imam’s uprising in 1958, the SAF had 
been reorganized to conduct internal defense missions in the north of 
Oman. A force of 2,000 men under arms, the SAF consisted of two 
infantry battalions and a small gendarmerie that patrolled the border with 
Abu Dhabi. The SAF was not equipped or prepared to conduct operations 
in Dhofar across 600 miles of desert, nor was it allowed to: The Sultan 
[Taymur] had decreed that security in Dhofar would be provided solely by 
the Dhofar Force, a company-sized private bodyguard led by a Pakistani 
lieutenant-colonel.145 
By contrast, Ladwig notes that, by the late 1960s, the PFLOAG “was capable of 
putting 2000 fighters into the field for offensive operations and had another 3000 militia 
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members,” many of whom were typically better armed than the SAF with Kalashnikov 
rifles, machine guns, mortars, RPG-7s, 122 mm Katyusha rockets, and SA-7 anti-aircraft 
missiles provided by their communist sponsors.146  By the spring of 1970, the insurgents 
had pushed the SAF off the jebel, the PFLOAG had severed the only road connecting 
Dhofar to the rest of Oman, and the insurgents were able to shell the British Royal Air 
Force (RAF) base in Salalah at will.147 
The military superiority of the insurgents, combined with Sultan Taymur’s 
reticence to build a force capable of challenging them, required the British to make 
significant changes to counter the threat posed by the PFLOAG. In a country run by an 
absolute autocracy, that change could only occur by removing the Sultan himself.  
Under the threat of a rising Marxist-inspired insurgency, the British decided to 
support the Sultan’s son, Qaboos bin Said, in a bloodless coup d’état on July 23, 1970.148 
Historian and political scientist Geraint Hughes observes that, after Sultan Qaboos came 
to power, he immediately recognized the need to reverse his father’s repressive policies, 
while simultaneously building up the SAF.149 As Ladwig notes, “Before the coup, in 
1970, the SAF numbered 3,000 men under arms; less than two years later that number 
had passed 10,000.”150 This military build-up coincided with an ambitious nation-wide 
development program.151 It was also during this time that the Sultan formally annexed 
the Dhofar region into the Sultanate of Oman.152 
The counterinsurgency campaign waged by Sultan Qaboos was in line with 
British COIN doctrine. Specifically, it stressed the psychological component of 
undermining the insurgent cause as much as the military aspects of the conflict.153 The 
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campaign followed a “clear-hold-build” approach, where the SAF and firqat tribal units 
worked together to clear the PFLOAG insurgents from the jebel, provide security for the 
local population, and then begin development projects to undermine the insurgent’s 
appeal to the local population.154 
The clear-hold-build effort moved from east to west, starting from the interior of 
Oman and working towards the border with Yemen. The SAF constructed a series of 
defensive lines, which started along the southern coast and extended into the jebel; these 
defensive lines, illustrated in Figure 7, became known as the Hammer, Hornbeam, 
Damavand, and Simba lines.155  
 
Figure 7.  Southern Dhofar Map with Defensive Lines. Source: Jeapes (2005).  
 
                                                 
154 Ibid., 286. 
155 Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East (London: Greenhill, 2005), 16. 
 73
Omani forces designed these defensive lines, which were essentially mine-wire 
obstacle belts, to restrict the PFLOAG from moving west to east and to provide a secure 
space for development projects. While the belts did not prevent all PFLOAG infiltration, 
they were an effective measure overall; by late 1975, the PFLOAG had been pushed back 
over the border into the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).156 The 
cessation of hostilities was officially declared on December 11, 1975.157 Halliday claims 
that, by the early 1980s, the remnants of the PFLOAG had “withered to a small group of 
Libya-based émigrés.”158 In short, the government of Oman achieved an outright military 
victory over the PFLOAG. 
External sponsors provided support to both the Sultanate of Oman and the 
PFLOAG throughout the conflict. In order to better understand the Omani government’s 
success in militarily defeating the PFLOAG, the following section explores the types of 
support sponsors provided the clients on both sides of this conflict.  
C. SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE PFLOAG 
The PFLOAG had four major, and two minor, sponsors. The PFLOAG’s major 
sponsors were the PDRY, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the USSR, and Iraq. 
The minor sponsors, who provided aid sporadically or in small amounts, were Libya and 
Cuba.  
1. Major Supporters: PDRY, PRC, USSR, and Iraq 
The PDRY was the most ardent and consistent supporter of the PFLOAG 
throughout the war. Peterson called the PDRY the most “important factor—outside of the 
revolutionaries themselves—in the prolongation of the rebellion.”159 The PDRY 
provided the PFLOAG with a base at al-Hauf, on the PDRY side the border, from which 
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the PFLOAG could launch offensives, and occasionally artillery, into Dhofar proper.160 
The PDRY also supplied the PFLOAG with funding, materiel and logistics, training, 
troops, and weapons.161 In addition, British military officer John Akehurst, who served as 
the commander of the Dhofar Brigade, argues that the PDRY gave the PFLOAG “regular 
air-time on the PRDY national broadcasting service known as Radio Aden.”162 In a nod 
to the PDRY’s dedication to the PFLOAG, Akehurst, contends, “The only non-guerrillas 
ever directly contacted on the Oman side of the frontier were PRDY regular troops, but 
this did not occur until late 1975.”163 
The PDRY maintained the longest support for the PFLOAG. However, by late 
1975, the PFLOAG had decisively lost the conflict and, in March 1976, a combination of 
Saudi Arabian diplomatic intervention and internal PDRY turmoil led to an official 
cessation of hostilities between the PDRY and Oman.164 
The most significant non-regional sponsor of the PFLOAG was the PRC, which 
provided consistent support to the rebels from as early as 1965.165 Most notably, the PRC 
provided the rebels with training in guerrilla tactics in both the PDRY and the PRC.166 
The PRC also reportedly supplied the rebels with materiel and logistics, and weapons.167 
Peterson reports that in 1971—the peak year of PRC involvement in the conflict—PRC 
advisors were on the ground at PFLOAG bases in the PDRY, and potentially in Dhofar 
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itself.168 This peak in PRC support indicated a change in the PRC’s overall approach to 
the Middle East. James Goode, a historian focusing on the Middle East and Iran, notes 
that the PRC became concerned with blocking Soviet expansion in the region. As Goode 
states, “At a time when the USSR was seeking to expand its influence in the Gulf and the 
Indian Ocean, Beijing wanted to establish better relations with more moderate regimes, 
such as Iran, which shared China’s concerns about Soviet expansionism.”169  
However, the PRC began distancing itself from the conflict after the 1971 peak of 
support. Hughes claims that this was the result of a combination of “intensified Sino-
Soviet hostilities, the PDRY’s alignment with Moscow, China’s rapprochement with the 
West and Iran after 1972, and its abandonment of revolutionary ideology.”170 This shift 
in PRC policy also coincided with the general timeline of U.S.-PRC rapprochement under 
President Nixon.171 To counter Soviet expansionism, Iran and the PRC established 
diplomatic relations with each other in August of 1971, and completed a full 
rapprochement by 1973.172 After Sino-Iranian rapprochement, the PRC sponsorship of 
the PFLOAG declined significantly, and the Soviets emerged as the major non-regional 
sponsor for the rebels.173  
While there was some overlap, generally, as the PRC’s support decreased, the 
USSR’s support increased. The USSR provided weapons, trainers, and advisors to the 
PFLOAG, beginning in the late 1960s.174 Additionally, Peterson claims that, by 1975, 
Soviet advisors “were reportedly directing the PDRY artillery barrage of Omani positions 
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in Dhufar, [sic]”175 essentially making the Soviet advisors active participants in the 
conflict, and elevated their participation to “troop support.”  While the PRC provided 
more support over the entirety of the conflict than the USSR, the USSR showed a 
willingness to increase its support when PRC support began to decline in the early 1970s. 
Peterson describes this dynamic by characterizing the PRC’s support as passive after 
Sino-Iranian rapprochement. Conversely, the USSR’s support steadily increased from 
1973 to 1975.176 
While the USSR initially tried to step up its support as the PRC pulled away, it 
too eventually began to reduce its support of national liberation movements in the Persian 
Gulf region.177 Galia Golan, a political scientist who has been widely published on Soviet 
policy in the Middle East, attributes this reduction in interest to a general realignment of 
Soviet priorities in the Middle East following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Specifically, 
Golan argues that the Soviets shifted their focus from national liberation movements to 
maintenance of the world socialist system.178 In addition, the Soviets classified the 
Dhofar Rebellion as a separatist movement, rather than an anti-colonialist movement—
making it a lower priority for Soviet intervention.179 Ultimately, the USSR’s support for 
the PFLOAG dwindled alongside Soviet regional aspirations.180 
The Iraqi contribution was smaller than that of the PDRY, the PRC, or the USSR. 
However, as a regional sponsor, Iraq was still a significant part of the conflict. Goode 
highlights that Iraq provided a monthly stipend to the PFLOAG.181  Goode further 
                                                 
175 Peterson, “Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula,” 289. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised,” 296. 
178 Galia Golan, “Moscow and Third World National Liberation Movements: The Soviet Role,” 
Journal of International Affairs 40, no. 2 (Winter 1987): 303–4. 
179 Ibid., 307. 
180 Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised,” 296. 
181 Goode, “Assisting Our Brother, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972–
75,” 450. 
 77
reports that Iraq provided the rebels with access to territory, materiel and logistics, 
training, and even provided “treatment for wounded fighters in its hospitals.”182 
Iraq continued its support of the PFLOAG through the early 1970s, but eventually 
ceased support after signing the Algiers Agreement with Iran in 1975. Not long after, in 
January 1976, Iraq and Oman formally established diplomatic relations, signaling an end 
for Iraq’s support to insurgent movements in the country.183 
2. Minor Sponsors: Libya and Cuba 
Libya, under Muammar Gadhafi, played a minor role late in the conflict. In 1975, 
Libya reportedly passed Russian made SAM-7 missiles to the PFLOAG. At one point, 
Ghaddafi also threatened to invade Oman if all of the British and Iranian troops 
supporting the Sultanate of Oman were not immediately withdrawn.184 Nothing 
significant, however, ever came of this threat. 
Cuba also played a minor role in the conflict, providing trainers for both the 
PDRY and the Dhofari rebels.185 Peterson claims that Cuban pilots even flew the 
PDRY’s MiG-21s.186  While Cuba had a close relationship with the PDRY, which likely 
encouraged the PDRY’s efforts to assist the PFLOAG, there is no evidence in the 
reviewed literature of a large-scale Cuban-PFLOAG relationship.  
D. SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE SULTANATE OF OMAN 
Oman had two major sponsors, the United Kingdom and Iran, and three minor 
sponsors: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Realistically, however, the United 
Kingdom was the most invested sponsor in building partner capacity in Oman, and the 
majority of the support provided to Oman occurred after the 1970 coup d’état.  
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1. Major Supporters: UK and Iran  
As previously described, the United Kingdom had a longstanding relationship 
with Oman’s ruling class that preceded the Dhofar Rebellion by centuries. The official 
military relationship, however, began with a treaty signed in 1958, in which the United 
Kingdom agreed to second their own officers to serve directly with the SAF.187 
Ultimately, active duty British officers commanded most of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, 
including British officers commanding SAF companies and battalions, a British officer 
serving as the Commander of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, and a retired British general 
officer serving as the Sultan’s Military Secretary.188 In addition, the RAF provided ten 
officers to help administer the small Sultan of Oman’s Air Force. The seconded RAF 
officers, however, received no language training and, unless a British Army officer was 
present with an Omani ground unit, close air support was not possible.189 
The United Kingdom also provided training for the SAF Training Regiment, 
including establishing courses that would allow Omani officers to advance past the rank 
of lieutenant, which had not been permitted under Sultan Taymur.190 Moreover, the 
Sultan sent newly commissioned Omani officers to military academies in Britain, just as 
Sultan Qaboos had been during his formative years.191 
For command and control of the counterinsurgency effort, the British gave the 
SAF access to its military infrastructure, and built a permanent headquarters on the 
British air base at RAF Salalah.192 The British also upgraded the SAF’s weapons, and 
provided materiel and logistics support.193 For intelligence support, the British provided 
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an intelligence detachment with the Special Air Service (SAS) contingent sent to Oman 
in 1970.194 After 1973, the British also began providing funding assistance to Oman in 
the form of subsidies for the costs of the seconded British officers, who were initially 
being paid by the Omani government.195 
In addition to their efforts with the SAF, the British also raised a number of 
“irregular militia” units out of the indigenous tribes of Dhofar; these units became known 
as the firqat.196 Ladwig describes that the firqat units served two primary purposes: as 
scouts for the regular SAF, and as “home guards” for areas already cleared by the 
SAF.197 He further describes that the firqat units operated as platoons and companies 
“built around a core of six to ten SAS personnel.”198 Eventually, there were 
approximately 2,000 firqat personnel.199 
At its height, British personnel support to Oman consisted of 150 seconded active 
duty officers, 300 contracted officers, and two squadrons of the British SAS.200 Perhaps 
most unique to conflicts of this era was the degree to which these British personnel were 
integrated into the SAF and firqat units with which they served. This unique 
organizational design created an “inter-structure,” in which the roles of the sponsor and 
client personnel became intertwined at the tactical level, an arrangement that in many 
ways surpassed typical client access to sponsor infrastructure. The relations between the 
United Kingdom and Oman continued in force after the conclusion of the war. While the 
Sultan “Arabized” the SAF following the rebellion, filling its ranks with Omani citizens, 
the Omani military still relied on British advisors as late as 2009.201  
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In addition to Britain’s extensive involvement in building partnership capacity, 
Iran also provided major support to the government of Oman. Iran’s first shipment of 
military supplies arrived in August 1972.202 The British initially turned the shipment 
away due to concerns over the regional perceptions of Oman accepting Iranian assistance. 
Eventually, however, the British chose not to interfere with Iranian aid or the 
development of the relationship between the two countries.203  
At the height of Iranian involvement, approximately 4,000 Iranian solders were 
serving in Dhofar. They operated under their own Iranian chain of command in contrast 
to the British-run SAF forces.204 In addition to troops, Iran sent weapons, including 
fighter aircraft and artillery, and significant materiel and logistics support, including 
helicopter troop carriers.205 The Imperial Iranian Navy also provided the Sultan of 
Oman’s Navy assistance in its insurgent interdiction mission.206 While the Iranians did 
less to build Oman’s capacity, and provided more troops to serve as independent combat 
units, the Iranian efforts were still critical for providing the necessary breathing room for 
the rapidly expanding SAF to grow.  
Iran kept forces in Oman after the war at the request of the Sultan, allowing Iran 
to capitalize on its growth in regional influence from the conflict.207 Iran gradually 
withdrew its forces over the course of several years. The last Iranian troops left in late 
1978, just in time for the Iranian Islamic Revolution.208 
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2. Minor Sponsors: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan 
In addition to the major support provided by the United Kingdom and Iran, 
several other countries provided minimal support to the Omani government. Jordan 
provided intelligence personnel, an infantry battalion, and a combat engineer company to 
Oman.209 Jordan also provided training for some Omani personnel in Jordan, including 
newly commissioned officers and pilots.210 Goode notes that, additionally, Jordan 
provided weapons in the form of “thirty-one Hunter-Hawker subsonic aircraft.”211 
Ultimately, Jordanian support was relatively late and short-lived. King Hussein 
withdrew the Jordanian troops after just six months, citing suspicions about Britain’s 
intent in the war.212 
Saudi Arabia was perhaps Oman’s most fickle supporter. As a result of its former 
support to groups in opposition to the Sultan, relations between Saudi Arabia and Oman 
were not good. As the DLF morphed into the PFLOAG, however, its goals turned from 
Omani nationalism to the spread of a Marxist socialist ideology across the entirety of the 
Arabian Peninsula. This ideological movement potentially posed as much a threat to the 
Saudi monarchy as it did to the Sultan of Oman, so Saudi Arabia retracted its support 
from the PFLOAG and reengaged the Sultan.213 
Over time, and encouraged by the United Stated under the auspices of the “twin 
pillars” policy, which aimed to empower both Saudi Arabia and Iran, Saudi Arabia 
reluctantly acquiesced to offering minor levels of support to Sultan Qaboos and the  
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Omani government. Saudi support to Oman included some very basic materiel support, 
and allowing some Omani soldiers access to Saudi Arabian military bases to conduct 
training,214 although there was no evidence in the reviewed literature that Saudi Arabia 
actually trained any Omani forces during the war. Ultimately, the Nixon administration 
expected Iran and Saudi Arabia to address regional issues themselves without direct 
involvement of the United States; Oman was one such example.215 
Pakistan also played a minor supporting role to the Omani government. Ladwig 
notes that the Pakistani military provided materiel and logistics support in the form of 
“supply, transport, and clerical duties.”216 Ladwig further claims that Pakistan also used 
non-commissioned officers to provide technical support for “intelligence, signals and 
mechanical functions.”217 However, this level of support was significantly less 
substantial than any of Oman’s other partners. The sponsor-client relationships for both 
sides of the conflict are summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5.   The Dhofar Rebellion Sponsor-Client Relationships  
 
 
E. APPLICATION OF THE FINDINGS OF MODEL II TO BPC IN THE 
DHOFAR REBELLION 
The findings of this thesis’ primary model (Model II), as noted in Chapter IV, are 
applicable to what BPC sponsors and clients experienced on both sides of the Dhofar 
Rebellion, specifically the effects of sponsor-client cultural differences, the length of the 
sponsorships, the number of major sponsors for each side, access to infrastructure, and 
the importance of funding support. Each of these points is elaborated on below.  
Clients Sponsors Types of Support Provided
People’s Front for the Liberation 
of the Occupied Arabian Gulf
(PFLOAG)
Peoples Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY)
Access to Territory, Funding, 
Materiel & Logistics, Training, 
Troops, Weapons
People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)
Materiel & Logistics, Training, 
Weapons
Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR)
Training, Troops, Weapons
Iraq Access to Territory, Funding, 




United Kingdom Access to Infrastructure,
Funding, Intelligence, Materiel 
& Logistics, Training, Troops, 
Weapons
Iran Materiel & Logistics, Troops, 
Weapons
Jordan Intelligence, Training, Troops, 
Weapons
Saudi Arabia Access to Infrastructure, 
Funding
Pakistan Intelligence, Materiel & 
Logistics
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1. The Difference in Culture 
The Dhofar Rebellion provides a unique illustration of Model II’s results with 
regard to the findings of hypothesis one, which is the greater the difference of culture 
between the sponsor and client, the lower the probability of BPC success. Ultimately, this 
case study does not confirm this hypothesis. However, this finding yields some important 
insights into how sponsors and clients with significant power distance and individualism 
differences can overcome this cultural obstacle and, conversely, how sponsors and clients 
with similar power distance and individualism scores can squander this advantage.   
At the outset of the conflict, the PFLOAG’s sponsors appeared to have had a 
significant advantage with regard to the cultural dynamics of power distance and 
individualism. As is indicated in Tables 6 and 7, the difference in power distance and 
individualism between the PFLOAG and their main sponsors (the PRC and the USSR) 
was very low.218 This dynamic should, in theory, have made the PRC and the USSR 
more likely to achieve success as BPC sponsors.  
Table 6.   China-PFLOAG Culture Difference Chart 
 
Table 7.   USSR-PFLOAG Culture Difference Chart 
 
                                                 
218 Hofstede, et al., Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, 57–59, 95–97. 
Actor Power Distance Score Individualism Score
China (Sponsor) 80 20
PFLOAG (Client) 80 38
Difference 0 18
Actor Power Distance Score Individualism Score
USSR (Sponsor) 90 39
PFLOAG (Client) 80 38
Difference 10 1
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The other two major sponsors of the PFLOAG—the PDRY and Iraq—actually 
have the same power distance and individualism scores as the PFLOAG, producing a 
difference of zero.219 The PDRY and Iraq, however, fell within the category of cultural 
and economic peers to the PFLOAG. Their failure in the conflict is a good example of the 
“near-peer effect” from Chapter IV where actors with similar log per capita GDPs (which 
was used as a proxy for power distance and individualism in constructing Model II) may 
find it difficult to provide meaningful support, regardless of the cultural similarities. 
As compared to the PFLOAG, Oman’s sponsors appear to have had a significant 
structural disadvantage with regard to power distance and individualism. As is 
highlighted in Table 8, the difference in cultural dynamics between the Omanis and their 
main sponsor, the United Kingdom, is much higher.220 The difference in power distance 
and individualism between Oman and Iran is lower but, as noted previously, Iran 
primarily participated in the conflict as a combatant, not as partners building capacity.221 
Despite the cultural disadvantage, the United Kingdom was ultimately successful in their 











Table 8.   United Kingdom-Oman Culture Difference Chart  
 
Table 9.   Iran-Oman Culture Difference Chart 
 
 
These findings beg the question, where did the PFLOAG’s sponsors go wrong? 
While all of this seems counterintuitive to the Chapter IV findings on hypothesis one, a 
closer look at the literature on the conflict reveals a reverse in cultural alignments at the 
tactical level.  
The Dhofar Rebellion was, at its core, an insurgency, and an insurgency needs the 
support of the population to succeed. Understanding this, the British undertook two major 
initiatives aimed at appealing to the cultural norms of the target population: a 
psychological warfare campaign, and the training of firqat units.222 International relations 
scholar Clive Jones describes that the psychological operations campaign “extolled the 
piety and power of an Islamic order synonymous with the Al Bu Said [the Sultan of 
Oman] dynasty, while raging against the apostates [the PFLOAG, Marxist guerrillas] 
whose belief in historical determinism ran counter to the very fabric of tribal society.”223 
Simultaneously, Jones notes that the British sought to harness the power of the tribes with 
                                                 
222 Jones, “Military Intelligence and the War in Dhofar,” 634, 638. 
223 Ibid., 634. 
Actor Power Distance Score Individualism Score
United Kingdom (Sponsor) 35 89
Oman (Client) 80 38
Difference 45 51
Actor Power Distance Score Individualism Score
Iran (Sponsor) 58 41
Oman (Client) 80 38
Difference 22 3
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the firqat units, who had “intimate knowledge of the physical topography as well as the 
eddies of tribal life on the Jebel.”224 
The British further bolstered the capability of the SAF units through the 
employment of a unique “inter-structure” program, which involved seconding British 
officers into the SAF, enabling the seamless integration of British and Omani forces. This 
approach aided the British in managing the cultural disparity within the BPC effort, and 
allowed for the full employment of allocated British resources in developing the SAF’s 
capability. As a result, it appears that the United Kingdom and Oman were able to 
overcome the cultural disadvantage inherent in their disparate power distance and 
individualism scores, and these efforts succeeded in gaining the population’s support in 
countering the rebellion. This finding suggests that, while culture should be taken into 
account, it is by no means an insurmountable obstacle. The British had a deep familiarity 
with Omani culture, based on generations of British-Omani relations, and they used this 
knowledge to their advantage.225 
By contrast, the PRC sponsored PFLOAG attempted—quite unsuccessfully—to 
superimpose their own version of collectivism onto the Dhofari people. Jones argues: 
“PFLOAG ignored the classic Maoist dictum of working with and among the people, 
rather than imposing a new, stridently secular order from the outset that denied agency to 
an indigenous sense of tribe or indeed religious belief.”226 Halliday notes that the 
PFLOAG agenda was classic Marxist rhetoric: “There had to be industrialization, 
agrarian reform, encouragement of local trade and the building of economic 
infrastructure. The revolution must free slaves, end the oppression of women, develop 
health and education and encourage trades union activity.”227 Much of this agenda would 
have hardly been recognizable to the rural, largely uneducated, and traditionally tribal 
population of Dhofar. Rather than harnessing and leveraging their client’s natural tribal 
                                                 
224 Ibid., 638. 
225 Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised,” 299. 
226 Jones, “Military Intelligence and the War in Dhofar,” 637. 
227 Halliday, Arabia without Sultans, 368. 
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collectivism, the PFLOAG’s sponsors squandered their structural cultural advantage by 
letting their own Marxist rhetoric get in the way. 
2. The Length of Sponsorship 
As noted previously, the United Kingdom’s sponsor-client relationship with 
Oman dates back to 1958.228 By the time the Dhofar Rebellion had ended in 1975, the 
British had a 17-year sponsor-client relationship with Oman. The length of this 
relationship may have contributed to the depth of British cultural understanding about 
Oman, which aided their ability to counter their enemy’s structural cultural advantage. 
This observation seems to run counter to Chapter IV’s findings on hypothesis two; 
specifically, that the longer a sponsor-client relationship continues in a given conflict, the 
less probable the sponsor is to achieve its desired end state—a military victory.   
Several details help explain this contradiction between Chapter IV’s findings and 
British success with helping their partner nation to end the Dhofar Rebellion after 17 
years. First, while the dates of the Dhofar Rebellion are typically listed as 1965–1975, the 
bulk of the sponsorship efforts from the United Kingdom and Iran occurred between 
1970 and 1975. If the surge of support, starting in 1970, is seen as the turning point in the 
BPC effort in Oman, then Chapter IV’s findings are upheld. The best practice is for a 
sponsor to front-load their support as much as possible in order to ensure decisive 
military victory for the client. Building on this point, it is reasonable to assume that, had 
Sultan Taymur permitted the British to mass their support in the 1960s, the conflict 
would have ended sooner. By contrast, the PFLOAG’s support ebbed and flowed 
throughout the conflict, which likely contributed to its loss.  
3. The Number of Sponsors 
The Dhofar Rebellion also confirms the findings of hypothesis three in Chapter 
IV, which is the greater the number of sponsors per client, the less likely the probability 
of BPC success. Oman had two major sponsors: the United Kingdom and Iran. Of these 
                                                 
228 Ladwig, “Support Allies in Counterinsurgency,” 68; Jones, “Military Intelligence and the War in 
Dhofar,” 630. 
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two, the United Kingdom engaged in a much larger share of the actual BPC mission. Iran, 
for the most part, deployed troops, which operated as combatants under their own chain 
of command. According to British accounts, the Iranians’ lack of understanding of 
counterinsurgency tactics rendered them only effective when used to secure terrain 
already cleared by the SAF.229 The use of Iranian forces to secure cleared territory 
allowed the available SAF elements, with their British officers, to fight the PFLOAG 
almost entirely under the influence of a single sponsor. 
The PFLOAG, on the other hand, had four major sponsors: the PRC, the USSR, 
the PDRY, and Iraq. While records are scant, it appears that this large number of 
sponsors presented several challenges to BPC efforts, including dissimilar goals among 
sponsors, competition for regional influence, and prioritizing Marxism over other 
ideologies. These differing goals most likely hindered unity of effort, and interfered with 
the potential for the PFLOAG to achieve success, which was outright military victory. 
4. The Importance of Funding 
The example of the Dhofar Rebellion also corroborates Chapter IV’s finding that 
funding is a critical support variable. Once Sultan Qaboos ascended to lead Oman, he 
dedicated approximately fifty percent of Oman’s GDP to combatting the rebellion.230 He 
increased the size of the SAF, and began development projects throughout Oman to 
address some of the population’s grievances. In 1971 alone, spending towards the conflict 
was approximately $478 million a year in 2016 USD terms.231 By 1973, the British 
began to subsidize some of these costs, further increasing the funding of the BPC 
effort.232  
By comparison, the PDRY was giving the PFLOAG an estimated $454,000 a year 
in 2016 USD terms.233 The Iraqi government was reported to have given the PFLOAG 
                                                 
229 Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised,” 287–88. 
230 Ladwig, “Support Allies in Counterinsurgency,” 72. 
231 Ibid., 76. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised,” 296. 
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the 2016 equivalent of an estimated $2.8 million a year in 2016 USD terms.234 The 
amount of aid from the PFLOAG’s other sponsors is not known, but it is reasonable to 
assume that there was a huge disparity between the financial support for the opposing 
sides in the conflict. 
Admittedly, because the Sultan was for the most part funding his own campaign, 
this example is not a clean comparison. However, regardless of where the funding came 
from, it is obvious that it made a difference in Oman’s ability to build a competent force, 
improve credibility with the local population, and achieve a military victory over the 
PFLOAG in the Dhofar region. 
F. CONCLUSION 
While the Dhofar Rebellion case study did not confirm each of the findings 
introduced in Chapter IV, it did illustrate that a sponsor can manage key variables from 
the thesis’ major findings to achieve success even in disadvantageous sponsor-client 
circumstances.   With regard to the results of hypothesis one, an increase in the sponsor-
client cultural differences will reduce the likelihood of BPC success, the Dhofar 
Rebellion demonstrated that the development of a British-Omani (sponsor-client) “inter-
structure” allowed the British to overcome a structural cultural disadvantage. This “inter-
structure” was an organizational design that went beyond the typical client access to 
sponsor military infrastructure, and included the assignment of British officers into the 
SAF. Conversely, sponsors of the PFLOAG pushed a Marxist agenda and goals on the 
rebel group, squandering cultural similarities between the sponsor and client.  
In reference to the results of hypothesis two—the longer a conflict goes on the 
lower the likelihood of BPC success—this case study displayed an example of partial 
corroboration. While the conflict itself was longer than the average conflict in the 
combined dataset, the surge in British and Iranian support to Oman in the last five years 
of the conflict proved to be decisive. This same surge demonstrated the findings of this 
                                                 
234 Goode, “Assisting Our Brother, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972–
75,” 450. 
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thesis’ Bayesian model averaging, that funding is essential to a BPC effort. Once the 
British and the Sultan begin to provide the necessary funding to the SAF, the SAF were 
able defeat the PFLOAG in five years.  
The complication of a higher number of sponsors may be the most notable link 
between this thesis’ findings and the case study. The larger number of major sponsors for 
the PFLOAG, and the accompanying variety in agendas, played a role in the failure of 
that BPC effort by overcomplicating it. Conversely, Oman had only two major sponsors, 
one of which was the primary BPC sponsor. The other, Iran, was primarily a military 
ally, providing troop support, but little else.  
This chapter used the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman as an example of a complex BPC 
operation. The chapter first discussed the relevant history of the region, and the timeline 
of the Dhofar Rebellion itself. Next, this chapter introduced the BPC sponsor-client 
relationships on both sides of the conflict, and discussed the outcome of these 
relationships. Finally, this chapter analyzed the Dhofar Rebellion in the context of 
Chapter IV’s findings.  
Chapter VI will provide a brief overview of this thesis, as well as the thesis’ key 
findings. The chapter will also discuss the implications of this research for the broader 
BPC enterprise. The chapter will end with recommendations for future research. 
 92




VI. CONCLUSION: CULTURE MATTERS, NOW WHAT?  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following the September 11 attacks and the rise of irregular threats since these 
attacks, the U.S. government has increasingly deployed special operations forces (SOF) 
across the globe, placing them in 70 to 135 countries.235 Building partnership capacity 
has been one of the key missions that SOF units have performed in these various 
deployments. As SOF expert Linda Robinson attests and others note, SOF’s role in BPC 
will continue to be a critical mission, requiring special operations practitioners, planners, 
and commanders to better plan for and execute these efforts around the globe.236  
This thesis aimed to answer the following research question: “What variables 
indicate an increased chance of success or failure of a building partner capacity 
program?” To investigate this question, the thesis proposed a quantitative model designed 
to examine further the effects of key variables commonly involved in building partner 
capacity. Drawing from a number of datasets, historical and contemporary examples, and 
the authors’ own operational experiences, this thesis explored the role of culture and 
other critical variables that may impact a successful BPC outcome, which is defined as 
the client achieving military victory.  
This chapter begins with a summary of the thesis and provides an overview of the 
key findings. It then discusses the implications of the research and its findings for the 
broader BPC enterprise. Finally, Chapter VI closes with recommendations for future 
research. 
                                                 
235 See: Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Obama’s ‘Boots on the Ground’: U.S. Special Forces Are 
Sent to Tackle Global Threats,” The New York Times, December 27, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1Ou12Ad. See 
also: Doug Bolton, “American Special Operations Forces Have Been Deployed to 135 Countries This Year 
Alone,” The Independent, September 24, 2015, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/american-special-operations-forces-have-been-
deployed-to-135-countries-this-year-alone-10516157.html. 
236 Linda Robinson, The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, Council Special Report (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2013). 
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B. OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
The thesis began by providing a comprehensive review of the literature on BPC. 
From this investigation, it highlighted a definition of BPC provided by Heisler: “a whole-
of-government approach that refers to any activity to enhance a partner’s ability to 
provide security within or outside of their borders.”237  It then analyzed the existing body 
of research on BPC, which it divided into three categories: qualitative, quantitative, and 
organizational design modeling. Finally, the thesis established a gap in the existing body 
of research, specifically a way to quantitatively analyze how culture may affect 
BPC missions. The thesis employed two cultural dimensions of organizational 
anthropologist Geert Hofstede as an analytical tool: power distance, which is “the degree 
to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is 
distributed unequally”; and individualism, which is “a preference for a loosely-knit social 
framework in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their 
immediate families.”238 
From this investigation of the literature, the thesis then provided an overview of 
the model this thesis used to analyze BPC relationships and programs. This discussion 
began with introduction of the primary and secondary variables of interest associated 
with this research effort: difference in sponsor and client culture, difference in sponsor 
and client forms of government, number of sponsors per client, and the length of the 
sponsor-client relationship. The thesis also underscored control variables used to account 
for socio-economic conditions specific to the sponsor, as well as the variables employed 
to account for various forms of sponsor support.  
The thesis used five datasets to statistically examine critical variables: the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) External Support Dataset,239 the UCDP Conflict 
                                                 
237 Heisler, “By, With, and Through,” 50. 
238 “Dimensions - Geert Hofstede,” accessed June 2, 2016, https://geert-hofstede.com/national-
culture.html. 
239 Croicu et al., “The UCDP External Support- Disaggregated/Supporter Dataset v. 1.0-2011.”  
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Termination Dataset,240 the UCDP Actor Dataset,241 the Center for Systemic Peace 
Polity IV Project Dataset,242 and the World Bank GDP Per Capita Dataset.243 From this 
investigation, it found that, the bigger the difference in culture the less likely the BPC 
effort will achieve success. The investigation also found that the more sponsors involved 
in a BPC program and the longer the BPC relationship persists, the less likely a client 
will achieve a military victory. This thesis, however, was not, able to determine 
quantitatively the effects of the difference in sponsor and client government types on 
BPC success or failure. 
The thesis then used a qualitative case study, the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman of 
1965 to 1975, to investigate further the critical variables discovered from the quantitative 
analysis. This case study demonstrated that, even where cultural similarities can be a 
structural advantage, they do not preordain success. Similarly, a structural cultural 
disadvantage can, with significant effort, be overcome. Furthermore, despite the length of 
a conflict, a surge in support by a sponsor at the right time can result in a notable shift in 
momentum. Finally, the case study underscored that, while the building of a coalition 
seems ideal, even like-minded allies can find difficulties in managing a single client. 
C. KEY FINDINGS 
This investigation revealed several important findings for success in building 
partnership capacity.  
First, the thesis found that, using power-distance and individualism as proxies, 
cultural similarities and familiarities are an asset and will increase the chance of client 
military victory. The Dhofar Rebellion case study highlighted, however, that cultural 
similarities do not guarantee client victory. In fact, a lack of similarities may be overcome 
with familiarity. In the Dhofar Rebellion, the British advisors did this by seconding 
                                                 
240 Kreutz, “The UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v. 2–2015.”  
241 “The UCDP Actor Dataset v. 2.2-2015.”  
242 “Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015 Dataset.” 
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officers into Oman’s military, and by leveraging the cultural dynamic of tribal 
collectivism inherent to the indigenous Dhofari people. Conversely, the major external 
supporters of the opposition failed to harness cultural similarities, and instead sought to 
transform the tribal collectivism of the region into a Marxist ideological revolution—a 
shift that ultimately created cultural disharmony and backfired.  
Second, the more sponsors involved in BPC efforts with a single client, the less 
likely the client will achieve success. This is likely because the more sponsors that are 
involved in a conflict, the more complicated the management of each sponsor-client 
relationship to the BPC effort. While the presence of multiple sponsors often lends 
strategic legitimacy to an operation, it appears it may complicate tactical operations, and 
ultimately have a detrimental effect on the overall success of the BPC sponsor-client 
relationship. The thesis’ case study clearly illustrated this finding. The Omani military, 
the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF), received the majority of its training, advisement, and 
assistance from the British military. This singular origin of BPC support allowed for not 
just political objectives to be unified, but also equipment, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures to be uniform. Conversely, Oman’s opposition in the conflict, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), had four major BPC 
sponsors: the PRC, the USSR, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and 
Iraq. Each of these major sponsors had their own take on objectives in the conflict—
making both support and training inconsistent for the PFLOAG. 
Third, the longer a sponsor supports a client the less likely the client will achieve 
success. This finding is counterintuitive to the qualitative literature on BPC, which tends 
to argue that the longer the relationship, the greater the chance of success in BPC. This 
finding, however, may be the result of an overall lack of success in prolonged conflicts 
and not just of the BPC effort. The mean length of conflict for the dataset used in this 
thesis was 4.48 years. Therefore, the reduction in probability of BPC success may be 
explained by the effects of protracted conflicts on clients in general. In other words, the 
longer the conflict goes on, the more likely it is to end in a peace agreement or stalemate, 
and the less likely it will end in client military victory, which is the definition of BPC 
success used in this thesis. 
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Fourth, the thesis found that, of the support types investigated, access to 
infrastructure and funding are the most important considerations with regard to BPC. 
Access to infrastructure included whether or not the sponsor allowed the client to use its 
military and intelligence infrastructure, and funding was limited specifically to monetary 
support. Access to infrastructure can be a difficult form of support for a sponsor to 
provide because it may mean sharing not only classified information, but also allowing 
the client to use the sponsor’s classified systems. To overcome this issue in the Dhofar 
Rebellion, the British created an “inter-structure” by seconding officers in the Omani 
military. This system allowed the SAF to capitalize on British technology and 
capabilities, without releasing sensitive British equipment or systems to the Omanis.  
The case study also demonstrated the significance of funding to a BPC effort. 
Until 1970 the British, and the Sultan of Oman, allocated limited funding to the conflict. 
However, after a British supported coup d’état in 1970, the new Sultan, along with the 
British, increased funding to the overall conflict and the BPC effort. This increase in 
funding bolstered the Omani’s military capability and contributed to its victory over the 
PFLOAG in 1975. The Omani government also invested considerable funds into 
development projects aimed at building a better relationship between the government and 
the population, and undermining the Marxists’ efforts to draw the population to their side. 
D. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BPC OPERATIONS 
From these findings, this thesis concludes with five recommendations for future 
BPC operations planning and execution: 
1. Sponsors should deliberately manage personal relationships to overcome 
cultural and national wealth disparities.  
As this thesis highlighted, too great a distance in culture between the sponsor and 
client can impede BPC success. Conversely a level of national wealth and culture that is 
too similar between the sponsor and client—the “near-peer” effect—can also reduce the 
likelihood of success in the BPC relationship.244 If a sponsor finds itself outside of this 
                                                 
244 See Chapter IV, “The Effects of Culture, Commitment, and Consensus on BPC,” (p. 51) 
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ideal difference with its client, then it should take steps to manage the difference. The 
British did just this in Oman during the Dhofar Rebellion by developing an intimate 
“inter-structure” that superseded their cultural disadvantages. The British achieved this 
by seconding officers to serve in the Sultan's Armed Forces, and partnering British SAS 
forces with tribal firqat units.245 The human cost of a sponsor’s military involvement is 
an important part of any BPC planner’s calculations; however, it is worth noting that 
establishing this type of inter-structure appears to aid BPC efforts where the sponsor is 
working at a cultural disadvantage. 
2. Sponsors should front-load support for their clients.  
The research shows that the longer a conflict persists, the less likely a sponsor-
client relationship will result in a military victory for the client. Given this finding, 
sponsors should strive to provide assistance to their clients as early as possible to 
maximize the potential for success. Although easy to recommend, this is in fact a difficult 
course of action to implement and requires assessing potential state and non-state clients 
early in a conflict for their needs and alignment with U.S. interests. Often times, potential 
clients are poorly organized, equipped, or trained, making an accurate assessment of their 
potential difficult. Once, however, a partner is selected, every effort should be made to 
provide meaningful support. Providing decisive support early may be the difference 
between a protracted conflict that ends in a precarious ceasefire agreement, or a client’s 
military victory, that enables the demobilization and disarmament of opposing forces.  
3. Sponsors should consider allowing clients the use of the sponsor’s military 
and intelligence infrastructure. 
Oftentimes in BPC relationships, the sponsor’s military, intelligence, and logistics 
infrastructure far exceed that of the client’s. Historically, there have been several 
approaches to overcoming this discrepancy. In Peru, the CIA allowed a Peruvian official 
to ride on sensor aircraft during counternarcotic operations to provide the Peruvians with 
intelligence.246 In the Dhofar Rebellion, the British seconded officers to the Omani 
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military, providing the SAF access to British military capabilities. In the Dhofar 
Rebellion, providing access to the sponsor’s infrastructure enabled Oman to achieve 
relative superiority and military victory. Therefore, assessing the needs of the client, and 
providing access to the sponsor’s infrastructure is an important means for quickly gaining 
resources, capabilities, and expertise needed to succeed in military operations.  
4. Sponsors should recognize the importance of funding to support their 
clients. 
Throughout its analysis, this thesis found funding to be one of the most important 
forms of support a BPC sponsor can provide.247 BPC planners should therefore aim to 
leverage as much funding as possible, as early as possible in the sponsor-client 
relationship, and aim to provide consistent funding levels throughout the BPC 
relationship. BPC planners often can focus on the type of training, particular weapon 
systems, or infrastructure as the most important type of support. This thesis, however, 
demonstrated that the simplest form of support—money—has one of the biggest effects 
on a client’s success. This finding does not mean that sponsors should distribute funding 
without accountability. Rather they should provide funding in concert with the other 
recommendation made in this thesis. Ultimately, sponsors should have close relationships 
with clients that, in addition to aiding in training and infrastructure support, would also 
allow the sponsor to monitor their client’s use of the sponsor-provided funding. 
5. Sponsors should shield clients from the complexities and tensions of 
multilateral BPC efforts.  
While building large coalitions can make military operations more politically 
palatable and provide greater international legitimacy, they may hinder successful BPC 
operations. BPC planners should seek to maintain unity of effort in operations through a 
single political and military chain of command whenever possible. When this is not 
possible, planners should mitigate differences among sponsors before imposing them on 
their mutual client. In short, sponsors should strive to shield their clients from the tactical 
                                                 
247 See Chapter IV, “The Effects of Culture, Commitment, and Consensus on BPC,” (page 62). 
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disorganization that is inherent in coalition warfare, which will hamper unity of 
command, effort and mission, likely hindering BPC success.  
E. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research should continue to develop a deeper understanding of the 
sponsor-client relationship. Specifically, the effects of different types of governments 
require further academic investigation. President Obama wrote in his opening remarks of 
the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy that, “Underpinning it all, we are upholding our 
enduring commitment to the advancement of democracy.”248 The idea of promoting one 
form of government, democracy, suggests that there will be tensions underlying any BPC 
effort between the United States and a non-democratic client. This thesis attempted to 
investigate this hypothesis, but failed to draw a conclusive finding regarding different 
forms of government and BPC efforts. This is a topic that deserves greater attention 
because the likelihood that the United States will partner with a client that has a different 
government system in the future is likely.  
Additionally, further research is needed to develop an optimization model that 
supports decision makers in their process of selecting ideal clients for BPC operations. 
By constructing an optimization model using the variables found in this thesis, 
researchers would be able to specify what economic and cultural differences are most 
conducive to developing successful BPC programs. The optimization model could also 
reveal what mix of support should be committed, as well as when that support should be 
allocated. While the optimization model would not provide a perfect solution, it would 
provide insights beyond a qualitative analysis, similarly to this thesis’ logit regression. 
F. CONCLUSION 
As indicated by the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, 
BPC will continue to be an important part of the United States’ global security approach 
for years to come. Leaders responsible for planning and executing these BPC missions 
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need to be informed of the effects that certain forms of support and cultural variables 
have on BPC missions. Ultimately, there is no technological shortcut that will overcome 
these challenges in the U.S. military’s BPC operations. True partner capacity building 
requires the United States to assume its share of the financial and physical risk to achieve 
victory. Ultimately, these risks include recognizing that sponsors need to manage closely 
multilateral BPC programs to ensure unity of effort. It also includes consistent and early 
funding to support clients. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, it may mean assigning 
U.S. military personnel to positions where they can build intimate and sustained 
relationships with clients. 
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APPENDIX.  SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Outcome 2,235 0.04 0.2 0 1 
Difference in Sponsor-Client 
Log per capita GDP 1,873 2.5 1.6 0.0 5.7 
Difference in Sponsor-Client 
Form of Government  2,235 7.5 5.3 0 20 
Number of Sponsors per Client 2,235 28.6 35.4 1 102 
Number of Years Sponsor- 
Client Support 2,235 4.9 6.9 0 34 
Sponsor Log per capita GDP  2,109 9.1 1.5 5.0 11.4 
Sponsor Form of Government 2,235 4.2 7.5 -10 10 
Troops  2,235 0.4 0.5 0 1 
Access to Territory 2,235 0.05 0.2 0 1 
Access to Infrastructure 2,235 0.05 0.2 0 1 
Weapons 2,235 0.3 0.5 0 1 
Materiel and Logistics 2,235 0.3 0.5 0 1 
Training 2,235 0.6 0.5 0 1 
Funding 2,235 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Intelligence 2,235 0.04 0.2 0 1 
Other forms of Support 2,235 0.03 0.2 0 1 
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